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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we argue that most of the work in the literature on behavioural-
based biometric systems using AI and machine learning is immature and unreliable.
Our analysis and experimental results show that designing reliable behavioural-based
biometric systems requires a systematic and complicated process. We first discuss
the limitation in existing work and the use of conventional machine learning meth-
ods. We use the biometric zoos theory to demonstrate the challenge of designing
reliable behavioural-based biometric systems. Then, we outline the common prob-
lems in engineering reliable biometric systems. In particular, we focus on the need for
novelty detection machine learning models and adaptive machine learning algorithms.
We provide a systematic approach to design and build reliable behavioural-based bio-
metric systems. In our study, we apply the proposed approach to keystroke dynamics.
Keystroke dynamics is behavioural-based biometric that identify individuals by mea-
suring their unique typing behaviours on physical or soft keyboards. Our study shows
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1.1 Access Control System
Any hardware, software, or administrative policy or process that controls access to
resources is called an access control system [27]. In other words, it is a security
technique that controls who or what resources can be viewed or used in a comput-
ing environment. It is a fundamental concept of security that reduces the risk to a
company or organization. Its main goal is to provide authorized access and to avoid
unauthorized access to resources. It performs the following overall steps: 1.) Identify
and authenticate users or other subjects attempting to access the resources 2.) Deter-
mine whether access is authorized 3.) Grant or restrict access based on the subject’s
identity 4.) Monitor and record access attempts
1.1.1 Authentication Methods
Authentication verifies the identity of the subject by comparing one or more factors
with a database of valid identities [27]. There are three basic methods of authentica-
tion:
Type-1: Something you know. Examples: passwords, personal identification num-
ber(PIN) or passphrase
Type-2: Something you have. Examples: smart card, hardware token, memory card,
universal serial bus drive(USB)
Type-3: It is a physical attribute of a person identified with different kinds of bio-
metrics, which includes Something you are. Examples: fingerprints, iris patterns, face
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patterns, etc. OR Something you do. Examples: signature, keystroke dynamics and
voice.
1.2 Biometrics
Biometrics are physical or behavioural characteristics that can be used to identify a
person electronically in order to provide access to systems, devices or data. Examples
of biometrics include finger print, facial patterns, iris patterns, voice, typing cadence.
These identifiers are unique to an individual and can be used in conjunction to ensure
greater identification accuracy.
1.3 Machine Learning
It is a branch of artificial intelligence focused on the premise that, with minimal
human input, systems can learn from data, recognize patterns, and make decisions.
Fig. 1.3.1 depicts three significant parts of the machine learning system:
Model: the system that makes predictions or identifications.
Parameters/features: the signals or factors used by the model to form its decisions.
Learner: the system that adjusts the parameters and, in turn, the model by looking
at differences in predictions versus actual outcome.




The most important aspect of a biometric device is its accuracy. To use a biometric
system for identification, a biometric device must be able to detect minute differences
in the information. It is essential to learn the characteristics of the particular system.
By doing that, one can get more understanding of the behavior of algorithms applied
in such systems. This information helps to take appropriate actions when it is needed
to maintain the system’s reliability. In the keystroke systems, the user gets used to
the typing device in a short time, so the typing patterns are likely to change over
time. To adapt the changing typing behavior, a system has to have some policy to
handle the situation. But what methodology a system should follow to address the
condition? We are trying to answer this question through our research.
1.5 Problem Statement
Throughout the years, advancements in software and hardware technologies have
reduced the costs of biometric authentication in addition to the advancement of com-
puting resources, networking and database systems have made it easy to connect
across a wide variety of geographic and networked areas. Thus, the acceptance of
the biometric authentication systems has increased over time. The current state-of-
the-art methods are used in various biometric systems to either identify or verify the
user. The techniques include statistical learning, machine learning, anomaly detec-
tion, etc. Less emphasis is given on designing reliable behavioural-based biometric
systems. In this aspect, the research focuses on providing a systematic approach
to design and build reliable behavioural-based biometric systems. To implement pro-
posed methodology experiments are performed using keystroke dynamics based access
control system.
1.6 Thesis Contribution
In summary, we make the following contributions:
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• We conducted a detailed study of behavioral biometrics’ based access control
systems which are using machine learning techniques. We studied how the
previous researches have built different biometrics based on various machine
learning algorithms and provided an in-depth analysis of how machine learning
works in keystroke biometrics.
• To better understand the system’s quality and performance, we have experi-
mented using the widely used biometric zoo’s [13] concept and provided our
findings and observations on it.
• Further, we investigated anomaly detection techniques techniques and used two
more datasets (from the android platform) to generalize our findings and also
to look for platform-dependent variances in our experimental results.
• Our main objective here is to provide guidelines of how to design and build
reliable keystroke dynamics based access control system. Furthermore, through
this research, we tried to understand the behavior of keystroke biometrics over
time. So, if the user’s typing patterns gradually change with time, then how
to update the user profile passively without altering user and maintain the
system’s reliability. All these research and findings led us to understand the
steps that one can take to engineer building the reliable keystroke biometrics-
based authentication system.
1.7 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we discuss how biometric zoos got proposed and how its evolution
took place. Additionally, we present an analysis of the works that have been
done using biometric zoo concepts for performance evaluation and enhancement
of different biometric systems. A study of machine learning-based biometric
systems, as well as anomaly detection based keystroke system, is also presented.
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• In Chapter 3, we discuss the access control systems and authentication methods.
The biometric authentication method with it’s authentication process and types
are described in detail. An introduction to the keystroke biometrics is also
provided.
• In Chapter 4, we mentioned various machine learning techniques including
multi-class classification and anomaly detection models. Additionally, evalu-
ation metrics for the classification is discussed.
• In Chapter 4, we show the design and implementation of our approach to test
the reliability of the keystroke biometrics based access control system.
• In Chapter 5, experiments and results of different machine learning-based bio-
metric access control system is demonstrated using biometric zoo concepts to
indicate the reliability of the existing techniques. In addition, experimental re-
sults of an anomaly detection based biometric authentication system with three
datasets, one with a regular PC keyboard and two additional datasets from
having touch screen keypads from the android platform, is also shown. In the
end, the observations are drawn from the comparison and similarities of the
different anomaly-based results.





Biometrics is a widely used technique to authenticate the users using their physical
or behavioral traits. There are many ways by which one can evaluate the biometrics
system’s performance. The most general evaluation metrics for biometrics are false
rejection rate, false acceptance rate, equal error rate and failure to enroll rate which
are described in detail in the section 3.3.2. Additionally, there is one more approach
familiar to biometric researchers and practitioners to evaluate the biometric systems,
that is the concept of biometric zoo.
2.1 Biometric Zoo
In a biometric authentication system, there are often the cases that some users are
consistently performing poor. The researchers and integrators are interested in finding
this type of poor performing user groups. Generally, majority of the users faces few
issues like they are rarely falsely accepted or falsely rejected by the system. However, a
small group of users may always behave in a way which increases system’s verification
errors. This type of users are naturally difficult to recognize and analysis of this kind
of users and their common characteristics can expose the fundamental weaknesses
of the biometric system. By considering these traits of the users one may be able
to develop more robust authentication systems. Several problem groups have been
characterized and given animal names which describe their behavior. The concept




2.1.1 Doddington’s Biometric Zoo
In 1998, while performing statistical tests for the performance discrepancy in speech
and speaker recognition systems, Doddington et al. [13] considered differences in
distinguishability of individual types of users. In particular, the authors proposed a
menagerie in which speaker differences were characterized using animal names, like
Sheep, Goat, Lamb, and Wolf [13]. They considered two scores, i.e., genuine score
and imposter score, to categorize the users in animal classes. Genuine Score is the
set of scores in which user k is matched with user k’s template. For example; when an
apple has a match with an apple (True Positive). In other words, it derives number
of times one can be easily matched with their samples. Imposter Score is the set
of scores in which either any j user is matched with user k or k user is matched with
any user j. For example, when an apple has a match with a peach or a peach has
a match with an apple (False Positive). In other words, it derives the number of
times when someone can successfully pretend to be someone else. The members of
the Doddington’s biometric zoo are described below:
• Sheep:
Sheep users have very high genuine scores meaning these are the kind of the
users who can easily access their accounts. So for them, the system performs
quite well. When these types of users provide their biometric for a match, the
sample matches nicely with saved samples of themselves and poorly with other
user’s saved samples.
• Goat:
Goat users have low genuine scores meaning these are the kind of the users who
are unable to access their accounts. Users categorized as goats are very hard
to recognize by the system. When they provide their biometric for a match,
they cannot match with one of their saved samples and as a result, the system
rejects the user. They are the ones who are responsible for the majority of the




Lamb users have high imposter scores. They are easy to mimic, meaning any
random user can get into the system pretending to be a lamb. When lambs
biometric is combined with a different person’s biometric, the resulting match
score will be higher than average. The majority of the system’s False Acceptance
Rate is due to the lambs.
• Wolf:
Wolf users also have high imposter scores. They are experts in impersonation,
meaning they can get into other users’ accounts by imitating their patterns.
When these users provide their biometric for a match, they have a higher chance
of getting matched with a different person’s stored biometric sample. It is said
that the wolves prey upon the lambs because, by definition, lambs are easy to
imitate.
2.1.2 Yager and Dunstone’s Biometric Zoo
Yager and Dunstone introduced four additional animals: Dove, Phantom, Chameleon,
and Worm in 2007 [53, 54]. It is based on the user’s relationship between their genuine
and imposter match scores. Following are the definitions for the animals introduced
in this category:
• Dove:
These users are the best possible users for a biometric system. The users have
high genuine score and low imposter scores. Their samples match well with
other saved samples of themselves and poorly against others. Doves are rarely
involved in any type of verification error.
• Phantom:
User categorized as Phantoms have low genuine and imposter scores. It is
implicit that they generate lower match scores regardless of who they are being
matched against. They can be the cause of False rejects but are unlikely to be




Chameleons always appear similar to others receiving high match scores for all
verifications. The users have high genuine and imposter scores. In other words,
they receive high match scores for all verifications, both genuine and imposter.
They are likely to cause False accepts.
• Worm:
Worms are the worst types of users that a system can have. They fall in
the range of highest imposter score and lowest genuine score. They are lowly
creatures, having few distinguishing characteristics, and hence match poorly
against themselves also they can be parasitic, leading to high match scores when
matched against others. They are said to be the cause of a disproportionate
number of system errors.
2.1.3 Doddington’s Biometric Zoo Vs. Yager and Dunstone’s
Biometric Zoo
Doddington’s zoo is based on the user’s average genuine or imposter match scores, on
the other hand, Yager and Dunstone’s zoo considers the relationship between genuine
and imposter match scores.
Goats are the users who are difficult to match and have lower genuine scores.
In here, Doddington has not considered the associated imposter score for each user.
shown on Fig. 2.1.1 [53], if the imposter score is also low, then the user falls into




Fig. 2.1.1: Relationships between genuine and imposter match scores and the
resulting animal
Lambs tend to produce high match scores when being matched against by other
users. Wolves are the users who get high scores when matching against others. In
both cases, imposter match scores are high, so, as per the fig. 2.1.1, if we consider
high genuine score, then the user falls in ‘Chameleons’ category, and if the genuine
score is low, then one falls in the ‘Worms’ category.
We can say that the Yager and Dunstone’s zoo is making the Doddington’s zoo
complete by introducing the concept of correlation between genuine and imposter
match scores.
2.1.4 Significance Of The Biometric Zoo
The biometric performance evaluation metrics like false rejection rate, false accep-
tance rate or equal error rate provides overall idea of how a system is performing
while, to get an insight of system’s issues the various categories of biometric menagerie
helps. The three metrics average out individuals and problems associated with the
subgroups of populations. The biometric menagerie serves as a diagnostic tool that
takes a more user-centric approach. It helps in finding the users who are affecting
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the system’s performance and also what kind of behaviors do they exhibit. The three
animal categories Goats, Lambs or Wolves makes this task easy for any researcher or
any biometric authentication device development companies to know their device’s
characteristics.
Biometric zoos can be used to improve the design quality of biometric based
authentication systems. By looking at each animal groups’ characteristics, it can
be said that if one apply the biometric zoo concepts on any biometric authentication
system and find out the possible goats/lambs and wolves categories then they can take
actions to handle and reduce those kind of user effects on the system. Additionally,
it can also help one to develop techniques to convert poor performing users like
goat, lamb or wolf into the sheep or dove categories, which can help to enhance the
reliability of the biometric system. Also, just to check the performance of the system
one can check for number of goats/lambs and wolves, the lower the value the better
the performance of the system.
2.2 Biometric Zoo Evolution
The works under this category show that the biometric zoo does exist in every bio-
metric technology and the authors try to understand why the zoo exists.
Teli et al. [49] proposed a theoretical framework to generalize biometric zoos across
algorithms and datasets by experimenting on the human face recognition dataset.
They tried to demonstrate the tests which show the existence of different levels of
biometric zoos like zeroth level, first level, second-level, and third-level zoos. Ex-
periments were carried out on two face recognition algorithms using two previously
proposed approaches by Doddington et al. [13] and Yager and Dunstone et al. [53, 54],
respectively. X2 test was performed to check the existence of different animals. Re-
sults concluded that zoos of order greater than one are rare, or it is non-existent.
Bodorin et al. [37] claimed that the biometric menagerie previously proposed
by Doddington et al. [13] and Yager et al. [53, 54] is fuzzy and inconsistent for
the iris recognition system, whether it refers to the user or its biometric templates.
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It was tested using 12 iris recognition tests on the iris image dataset. All tests were
performed using the second version of the Circular Fuzzy Iris Segmentation procedure.
The results suggest that the Goat concept is the most consistent, while the wolf is
not a fuzzy concept. It also presents that biometric menagerie in any terms depends
on the calibration of the iris recognition system.
Zheng et al. [16] believed that both the theories carried out by Doddington et
al. [13] and Yager et al. [53, 54] disregarded threshold in biometric systems when
classifying animals which intern might reduce the accuracy of the animal detection.
To prove their belief, they experimented with both the concepts on a 100 % accu-
rate finger vein dataset with 0.3 as a threshold using Kruskal Wallis Test to test
Doddington Zoo’s presence and to detect Yager zoo genuine and imposter scores were
considered. Results showed the existence of both the menagerie animals (Goat, Lamb,
wolf, Chameleon, Worm, and Phantom) in the dataset, which should not be the case.
They proposed an optimized method Biometric Menagerie Detection with threshold
(BMDT) based on Yager’s theory and experimentally demonstrated that its accuracy
is better.
2.3 Performance Evaluation and Enhancement Of
Biometric Systems Using Doddington’s Zoo
Authors under this category have used biometric zoo to check for the number of
goats/lambs/wolves that are considered as the system’s flaws. Some of them have
utilized this knowledge to enhance their system’s performance by proposing different
techniques.
In the context of fingerprint and iris datasets, Ross et al. [42] proposed a selective
fusion approach by getting the weakest users, which contributes to the majority of
FAR (False Acceptance Rate) and FRR (False Rejection Rate) with the help of Dod-
dington’s zoo. Statistical framework based on the concept of percentiles of match
scores and F-ratio was used to categorize the users. Only weak users were asked
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for further information. Through this incremental method, they claimed that the
system’s overall matching accuracy increased and computational time got decreased.
Jeffery et al. [33] classified subjects from the iris dataset as biometric zoo animals for
several algorithms and studied the consistency of the classification algorithms. iris-
BEE, MIRLIN and OSIRIS algorithms were compared and to present results ROC
(receiver operating characteristic) curve depicting FAR and FRR was plotted. Their
results showed that biometric menagerie classification is algorithm dependent and it
also relies on which kind of iris is chosen(left/right). The authors also claimed that
a person classified as weak should not be considered as weak because of algorithms’
disagreement and the mismatched classification. Howard et al. [17] observed that
biometric menagerie is based on the assumption that match scores are partially de-
pendent on the specific subjects involved in the comparison operation. They claimed
that the rate of identification is significantly affected by certain inherent properties
of the subject, such as its ethnicity, gender and color of the eye, as well as the char-
acteristics of the image, in particular the wavelength of light used by the sensor. To
understand the iris recognition system’s performance, a regression tree model was
used to perform experiments.. Results demonstrated that only a single factor differ-
ence was found to cause a 2-3 times increase in the false rejection rate(number of goat
users).
Ahmad et al. [45] analyzed the goat user within the population of an offline signa-
ture biometrics using HMM (Hidden Markov Model) based computational approach.
They identified four goat populations on the basis of four local features (pixel den-
sity, center of gravity, angle, and distance) to interpret if they have any correlation.
They tried to test whether different features influence the goat results, experiments
demonstrated that they were highly correlated with each other. EER (Equal Error
Rate) was considered to analyze their co-relationship. Sundararajan et al. [47] stud-
ied the challenges of a biometric system based on the writing style of individuals by
investigating the system for the presence of goats, wolves, or lambs. The presence of
the animals was verified using match score, FAR and FRR. They Suggested a method
using person-specific characteristics referred to as “style signatures” To obtain Style
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signatures for each person, they trained N One-vs-Rest (OVR) binary classifiers for
N individuals. Experimental results showed that the use of person-specific Style sig-
natures might be better at lowering false acceptance and false rejection rates, thereby
addressing the goat/wolf/lamb behavior of individuals to a certain extent.
DeCann et al. [12] studied the impact of the biometric zoo on the relationship
between the ROC curve and CMC (Cumulative Match Characteristic) curve created
by the collection of genuine and impostor match scores. They designed a sampling
procedure that reassigns the match scores to the animals of Doddington’s zoo [13].
Experiments were performed using figure print and gait scores. ROC curves were plot-
ted using false match rate (FMR) and the false non-match rate (FNMR) CMC curves
were potted using the top 10 match scores, which exceeded threshold and system’s
identification accuracy for the same. Observations showed that several CMC curves
could be linked to a single ROC curve. Kirchgasser et al. [21] used Doddington’s
zoo [13] concept to describe the Fingerprint template ageing influence. To investigate
the same, they labelled data of users, including time separation of 4 years with dif-
ferent animal category names described by biometric menagerie concept. F-Test and
Kruskal – Wallis tests were used to generate animal groups. The results demonstrated
that regardless of which dataset and recognition systems were considered, the labelled
users in the older datasets were not the same as in the new ones. They confirmed
that fingerprint ageing could be the cause of the high amount of fluctuation in the
detection results.
Neal et al. [31] explored the soft biometric classification of demographic and
behavioral attributes using phone data collected from several subjects. Due to people
exhibiting high intra-class variance templates and queries are affected in terms of how
well they match. To analyze further in the matching error, biometric menagerie has
been used. The similarity matrix was generated to evaluate animal results. Findings
showed that many subjects are characterized as goats or wolves in their calling and
SMS habits.
Poh et al. [36] claimed that Doddington’s categorization [13] does not provide a
criterion for ranking users in a database on the basis of their performance variability.
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They proposed a user-dependent performance criterion that requires a limited num-
ber of genuine training scores. Three Log Likelihood Ratios were discussed: Z-norm,
Z-shift and F-norm and developed a user specific score normalization scheme, which
is a constrained F-norm ratio. Experimental results proved that user-dependent vari-
ability could be decreased by this scheme. Benchmark dataset XM2VTS containing
match scores of 7 face systems and 6 voice systems were used. Schnitzer et al. [43]
investigated the relationship of the animals of the Doddington Zoo [13] to the con-
centration of distances and the problem of hubness in a speaker verification system.
Experiments have shown that, due to the high feature dimensions, goats and wolves
are likely to emerge. For evaluation, GMM (Gaussian Mixture Model) trained on
Mel frequency cepstrum coefficient (MFCC) is used. They claimed that hubness is
an integral part of the development of the Doddington Zoo for speaker verification
systems.
2.4 Doddington’s Zoo Effects On Keystroke Dy-
namics
Wang et al. [51] presented frog boiling attacks that stealthily leverages the template
update scheme of the keystroke verification system to poison user templates. The
impact of the attack on the user groups identified by the biometric menagerie was
investigated. They illustrated how the attack mutates the “Doddington Zoo [13],”
as it turns historically well-performing animals (sheep) into ill-performing animals
(lambs or goats) systematically. Attacks were performed on scaled manhattan verifier,
selective fusion verifier and all fusion verifier.
Mhenni et al. [25] proposed method that used keystroke dynamics to help password-
based applications to overcome hacking attacks. Users were classified into multiple
categories according to the Doddington Zoo classification [13]. They applied an adap-
tive strategy specific to each category of users. Three different adaptive mechanisms
were used: the growing window mechanism, the sliding window mechanism and the
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least frequently used mechanism. An update strategy specific to the user class has
been identified, which improved the obtained performances. Users with significant
intra-class differences (Goats) have a greater comparison scale. Also, users who were
more vulnerable to hacker attacks (lambs) were given higher decision thresholds. Ad-
ditionally, Mhenni et al. [26] proposed a user-dependent adaptive strategy based
on the Doddington zoo [13] as well as Yager and Dunstone’s menagerie [53, 54], for
the recognition of the user’s keystroke dynamics. They applied an adaptive strategy
specific to the characteristics of each user of both the menagerie aiming to solve the
intra-class variation problems. Experiments were performed using the GA-KNN clas-
sification algorithm. An update strategy specific to the user class has been identified,
which improved the obtained performances.
2.5 Machine Learning Based Biometric Systems
Under this category, we have reviewed the biometric systems that are using machine
learning-based algorithms for either identification or verification task. Additionally,
the evaluation metrics considered are also mentioned. Please note that none of the
mentioned researches has considered quality score factor while taking its decisions.
Quality score denotes the quality of the user’s provided sample, in other words it
derives how good is quality of the user’s provided sample.
Boles et al. [9] used the Support Vector Machine algorithm for identification task
in a voice biometric system . They considered accuracy for evaluation of the sys-
tem. Marsico et al. [11] applied Support Vector Machine and various neural network
algorithms like Wavelet Probabilistic NN, Back Propagation NN, Radial Basis Func-
tion NN, Restricted Boltzman Machine and Multi Layer Perceptron for identification
of Iris biometrics. They have considered the threshold in the system and evalu-
ated the system with accuracy, false acceptance rate(FAR), false rejection rate(FRR)
and equal error rate(EER). For identification of brain EEG signals Bashar et al. [7]
used machine learning algorithms like multiscale shape description (MSD), multiscale
wavelet packet statistics (WPS), multiscale wavelet packet energy statistics (WPES)
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for feature extraction and for matching purposes they have considered error-correcting
output code multiclass model (ECOC) using SVM. They calculated accuracy to eval-
uate the system’s performance. Sundararajan et al. [48] have presented a survey
on deep learning based biometric systems. In the survey, they have mentioned var-
ious other works that have used deep learning algorithms like Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN), Deep Belief Network (DBN), Deep Boltzman Machine (DBM), Con-
volutional DBN (CDBN), Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM), Recurrent Neural
Networks, etc. for both identification and verification tasks for the biometric modal-
ities like Face, Fingerprint, Palm Print, Iris, Voice, Signature, Gait and Keystroke.
The works mentioned have considered accuracy, false acceptance rate (FAR), false
rejection rate (FRR), mean absolute error (MAE), equal error rate (EER) or their
combination for the assessment of the system.
Alghamdi et al. [3] used Medians Vector Proximity (MVP), K-Nearest Neighbor
(KNN) and Random Forest Classifier for identification of smartphone user’s gestures.
They have considered the threshold in the system and evaluated the system on the
basis of equal error rate(EER) and classification time. Bo et al. [8] applied two class
SVM model for identification of touch and movement based biometric. They have
used threshold in the system and considered accuracy, false acceptance rate and false
rejection rate for system evaluation.
For identification in keystroke biometrics, Krishnamoorthy et al. [22] have ap-
plied SVM-RBF with one vs. one decision shape function. They have considered
the threshold in the system and evaluated the system using F1-Score and accuracy.
Ramu et al. [40] used the Gaussian probability density function and SVM with lin-
ear kernel for identification of keystroke biometric. They have used threshold in the
system and considered accuracy, false acceptance rate and false rejection rate for sys-
tem evaluation. In the context of tap and Keystroke biometric, Miluzzo et al. [28]
considered Ensemble Classification Technique by using K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN),
Random Forest Classifier, Multinomial Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machine




2.6 Use Of Anomaly Detection In Keystroke Bio-
metrics
Kevin Killourhy and Roy Maxion [19] applied various anomaly detection algorithms
on the benchmark keystroke dataset and examined which are the top-performing al-
gorithms for the keystroke biometrics. The main goal of their research was to collect
a data set, establish an evaluation procedure and equally evaluate the performance
of several anomaly detection algorithms like; Manhattan (scaled), Nearest Neighbor
(Mahalanobis), Outlier Count (z-score), SVM (one-class), Mahalanobis, Mahalanobis
(normed), Manhattan (filter), Manhattan, Neural Network (auto-assoc), Euclidean,
Euclidean (normed), Fuzzy Logic, k Means, Neural Network (standard). In the pro-
cess, they identified which detectors have the lowest error rate on their collected
dataset (e.g., the Nearest Neighbor (Mahalanobis) detector) and they provided a
data set and evaluation methodology that can be used by the community to evaluate
new detectors and report comparative results. Furthermore, Kevin Killourhy and Roy
Maxion [20] tried to find out the factors which affect the error rates of the anomaly
detectors in the context of keystrokes dynamics. The factors that they considered
for testing are the algorithm itself, amount of training, choice of features, use of
updating, impostor practice, and typist-to-typist variation. They also experimented
to know the approach that can be used to assess the effects of the factors on the
anomaly detectors. In their approach, they experimented using a benchmark dataset,
done statistical analysis using linear mixed analysis models and validated the model’s
predictions using new data. Their results showed that all the factors had a major
influence on error rates except impostor practice and feature set.
Ivannikova et al. [18] proposed two approaches for detecting anomalies in the CMU
dataset [19]. Dependence Clustering based approach and a k-NN-based approach
that demonstrated strong results. Some of the current methods do use real data from
users for training and validation. They designed a cross-validation procedure with
artificially generated impostor samples that improve the learning process and allows
for a fair comparison with previous works. They adapted a spectral clustering style
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algorithm previously used only for clustering problems for the anomaly detection task.
Experimental results demonstrated that both proposed approaches outperformed the
previous state-of-the-art results for the CMU dataset for unsupervised learning.
John V. Monaco [30] described fifteen anomaly detection systems submitted to the
Keystroke Biometrics Ongoing Competition (KBOC). The competition presented a
task to identify anomaly with a public keystroke dataset containing over 300 subjects
typed case-insensitive repetitions of their first and last name, and as a result, keystroke
sequences could vary in length and order depending on the usage of modifier keys.
Participants had the task of designing biometric keystroke verification systems that
achieved a low cross over rate on a set of unlabeled query samples. To counter this,
a preprocessing algorithm for keystroke alignment was developed in order to obtain
a semantic correspondence between keystrokes in inconsistent sequences.
Mudhafar M. Al-Jarrah [2] presented an anomaly detector for keystroke dynam-
ics authentication, based on a medians vector proximity method, validated by an
empirical analysis of an independent keystroke data benchmark. A password typing-
rhythm classifier is introduced, which can be used as an anomaly detector in genuine
and impostor users’ authentication.
2.7 Gap Between The Production Based And Re-
search Based Approaches
In our opinion, there are two cases:
1. While doing their experiments with the benchmark keystroke dataset Killourhy
and Maxion [19] have considered half of the samples from the total available
samples to train the 14 different anomaly detectors and provided their findings
based on its results. But in reality, that is not a feasible task. One can not ask
the user to enter the password for say 200 times or 300 times. It will take long
time and meanwhile, the typing behavior of the user may change or the user
might get frustrated. In other kinds of literature, as mentioned in the category
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“Machine Learning Based Biometric Systems” in the section 2.5, they are using
various multi-class classification techniques, which is fine, but again majority
of these researches are using a large number of data for training. Also, in the
machine learning classification for the unseen sample, it is easy to identify a user
because the classifier has a tendency always to find an identity, it will never say
no.
2. The best results that the authors are getting in [19] are mostly the distance-
based anomaly detectors. But in the keystroke dynamics, user typing patterns
change over time, so the distance may not remain the same all the time. On the
other hand, If we consider the fingerprint detection system, then the distance-
based detectors work well because the distances almost remain the same, so the
system accepts the user as a genuine user for a longer duration. So, it is not
clear from the works of literature on how keystroke biometrics impacts on the
accuracy of the system over time.
3. The majority of the works in the literature are using same password to record
users’ keystroke samples. However, in the keystroke dynamics, if the user
changes his password then the typing pattern completely changes. In this case
the feature selection will not work. Because, in reality, different users will have
different passwords with different length. One would not be able to build the





In this chapter, we start by describing what is access control systems and what are the
various authentication methodologies used in those systems. The chapter also talks
about biometrics in detail including it’s authentication process and general evaluation
metrics. Furthermore, a brief introduction of physical and behavioral biometrics
is provided. Additionally, keystroke dynamics a type of behavioral biometrics is
described in detail with digraph representation.
3.1 Access Control System
Access control is a selective restriction to the access of the data. It performs identifi-
cation, authentication and authorization of users and entities by evaluating required
login credentials. Where, identification is the process of subject claiming an identity.
A subject is required to provide its identity to proceed further for authentication
and authorization operations. Authentication is a method used to determine whether
someone is what they appear to be. It verifies the identity of the subject by comparing
one or more factors with a database of valid identities [27]. Authorization indicates
who is trusted to perform certain actions. If the operation is permitted the subject
is authorized otherwise it is not authorized. The access controls can be implemented
in three ways: administratively, logically/technically, or physically [27].
• Administrative Access Controls: Administrative access controls are the
policies and procedures established by the safety policy and other regulations
or specifications of an organization. Examples of administrative access controls
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include policies, procedures, hiring practices, background checks, classifying
and labeling data, security awareness and training efforts, reports and reviews,
personnel controls, and testing [27].
• Logical/Technical Controls: Logical access controls are the tools used to
monitor access and to secure systems and resources through hardware or soft-
ware. Examples of logical or technical access controls include authentication
methods (such as passwords, smartcards, and biometrics), encryption, con-
strained interfaces, access control lists, protocols, firewalls, routers, intrusion
detection systems, and clipping levels [27].
• Physical Controls: Physical access controls involve specific measures used to
prevent, monitor or identify external interaction with devices or locations inside
the facility. Examples of physical access controls include guards, fences, motion
detectors, locked doors, laptop locks, badges, swipe cards, video cameras and
alarms [27].
3.2 Authentication Factors/Methods
To verify the user’s identity authentication system considers some factors or methods.
There are three factors or methods for authentication:
• Knowledge Based Factor (Type-1): It is depended on what the user knows.
Examples of knowledge based or type-1 factors include passwords, personal
identification number(PIN) or passphrase.
• Possession-based factors (Type-2): It is based on what a user possess(has).
Illustrations of knowledge based or type-2 factors include smart card, hardware
token, memory card, universal serial bus drive(USB)
• Inherence-based factors (Type-3): This is defined according to what the
user is, or how he does. It is a physical attribute of a person identified with
different kinds of biometrics [27] Examples in what user is includes fingerprints,
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iris patterns and face patterns. Examples in how he does category include
signature and keystroke dynamics
All these factors become stronger over time if they are implemented correctly. Au-
thentication can be performed using the combination of one or more above mentioned
factors. Based on number of factors considered authentication can be divided into
three categories:
• Single Factor Authentication: As the name suggests it uses only one factor
to authenticate a user trying to get access into the system. It is more vulnerable
to attacks.
• Two Factor Authentication: It combines any two factors to increase the
system security. For example, there are many banking applications which re-
quires users to enter their password as well as a one time password(OTP) sent
by the bank to the individual’s device to authenticate the user.
• Multi Factor Authentication: It uses more than one authentication factors
to generate a layered structure of authentication. In simple words, It requires
the user to enter two or more credentials to login into the system. It not only
increases the security but generates a reliable false proof system.
3.3 Biometrics
It refers to any automatically measurable physiological or behavioral traits which are
distinctive to an individual. Physiological characteristics are related to the shape of
the body (Something you are). As shown on Fig. 3.3.1 [55], examples of physiological
characteristics include finger print, face, hand, iris, finger vein. Behavioral character-
istics are related to the pattern of behavior of a person (Something you do). As shown
on Fig. 3.3.1 [55], examples of behavioral characteristics include voice, keystroke, sig-
nature. By using unique biological characteristics, biometrics is the most suitable
means of identifying and authenticating individuals in a reliable and fast way.
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Fig. 3.3.1: Biometrics
With the biometric technology there is nothing to lose or forget since the char-
acteristics or traits of the person serve as the identifiers [55]. Also, many of these
identifiers remain intact for longer time. The authentication factors like passwords
and PINs can be stolen easily. Biometrics should reduce the risk of compromise the
likelihood that an adversary can present a suitable identifier and gain unauthorized
access [55].
According to the requirements, biometrics are utilized for either of the two pur-
poses: identification or verification. In identification, the biometric system asks and
tries to answer the question “Who is X?” In this process, the biometric device reads
and compares the samples against each record or template in the database. This type
of comparison is referred to as one to many (1:n) search. Verification is when the
systems ask and try to answer the question, “Is this X?” After the user claims the
identity of X. In a verification procedure, the biometric device needs input from the
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user, at which time the user asserts his or her identity through a password, token, or
user name (or any combination of the three). The user input points the system to a
template in the database. It then processes and compares the sample with or against
a user-defined template. This kind of search is called one to one (1:1). In this case,
the system either finds a match or fails to find a match.
3.3.1 Biometric Authentication Process
Fig. 3.3.2: Biometric Authentication Process
As shown on Fig. 3.3.2 [32], the biometric authentication process starts with the
“Data Acquisition”, where the user provides there biometric sample through any bio-
metric sensor. The sample is acquired and forwarded to the “Signal Processing” unit
for matching purposes through the transmission channel. When the sample arrives at
the signal processing unit, segmentation is performed, and any unwanted data(noise)
is removed from the sample. Next, the segmented sample is provided to the feature
extractor unit that extracts essential features out of the sample and generates a tem-
plate for matching. The output of the “Extraction and Segmentation” unit is “Quality
Score” which scores the quality of the user-provided sample. The matching algorithm
considers template generated through “Extraction and Segmentation” and based on
the application, it matches the template with one or more reference templates and
produces a matching score that describes how well a template matches the reference
template(s). Both the scores are considered by “Decision Policy” of the system to
decide whether there is a match (Yes?) or not (No?). Generally, a predetermined
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threshold for both scores are considered. If both scores are above that threshold, it
is said to be a match (Yes). Otherwise, if the quality score is above threshold and
match score is below the threshold, then the system rejects the user and if the match
score is above the threshold and quality score is below the threshold, then the system
asks the user to provide the biometric sample again.
3.3.2 Evaluation Metrics
False Rejection Rate (FRR) / False Non-Match Rate (FNMR):






where FR = Number of incidents of False Rejections
N = Total number of samples
False Acceptance Rate (FAR) / False Match Rate (FMR):





where FA = Number of incidents of False Acceptance
N = Total number of samples
Equal Error Rate (EER) / Crossover Rate:
Combination of FAR and FRR helps to understand the usefulness of a particular
biometric device in the given scenario. Equal Error rate or Cross Over Rate is the
intersection of false rejection rate and false acceptance rate (Fig. 3.3.3 [32]). The
lower the rate the better the biometric system.
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Fig. 3.3.3: Equal Error Rate or Crossover Rate
Failure To Enroll Rate (FER) It is the percentage of population that are
unable to enroll into the system.
3.3.3 Physical Biometrics
Physiological characteristics such as fingerprints, iris, finger vein patterns and face
geometry play a vital role in user verification to verify users belonging to a large
population. It is very convenient way of presenting identity because different shape
of body presents the identity so there are no risks that a user tend to forget. Also,
it almost remains the same for several years so there is no need to update it now
and then. It is stable and reliable as well as easy to use and setup. Though these
structures make each individual body unique, they are static, which leaves them more
vulnerable to being scanned or photographed, then reconstructed for malicious use
[35].
3.3.4 Behavioral Biometrics
Behavioral biometrics is used to uniquely identify a user through their particular
behavioral pattern or actions. The benefit of using behavioral biometrics over the
physical biometrics is that it is stored in terms of numeric timing, position and statistic
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data which is not a physical representation like a shape of a finger print or a face.
So, even if the information is stolen the attacker is unable to interpret the data and
regenerate certain behavior. Also, unlike physical biometrics the stored data keeps
evolving and changes over time which means even if the behavior biometrics is stolen
after some time it is of no use because it keeps on changing. Whereas, physical
biometrics like finger print once stolen then it can be used for multiple purposes for
longer duration. Every person behaves in a completely individual way. The gait with
which someone walks, the fluctuations in vocal tone as they speak, and the cadence
with which they type are as unique as fingerprints but are much harder for malicious
actors to capture, much less duplicate. Behavioral biometrics uses these patterns to
authenticate users and protect data [35]. Behavioral biometrics includes gait, voice
patterns, keystroke dynamics, touch screen swipes/ mobile interactions and cursor
movements.
3.3.5 Keystroke Dynamics
It is a type of behavioral biometrics that measures how a subject uses a keyboard
based on the timing and latency between a key press and key release event on a
keyboard. Software is used to capture it, so the technique can be applied to any
system that accepts and processes keyboard input events [32]. It can be used for
single authentication events or continuous monitoring. For example; It can be used
to harden the passwords, which means that the keystroke dynamics can be deployed
for each user to augment the existing password by requiring that the password should
be entered in a manner consistent with the intended user [32].
It is a strong authentication procedure which involves typing a password and the
way of typing it. This double-layer defence provides better protections against all
threats on the internet, such as brute force attack, dictionary attack, and actual
shoulder surfing. The brute-force attack includes a hacker trying out all possible
combinations of passwords, and is easier to interpret if the intruder knows what
we know. The dictionary attack is a type of brute force attack which consists of
trying every word of the dictionary as a password which works in most of the cases.
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In the shoulder surfing the attacker observes the password while one is typing it.
The keystroke dynamics serves as the best solution for all these attacks, because it
combines the biometric pattern with the password. By doing so, it becomes hard
for an attacker to impersonate means that it is tough to regenerate if observed or
even if one knows the correct password. One’s typing pattern is a unique behavioral
characteristic of an individual. Additionally, keystroke dynamics has a resettable
signature which means that if you change the text, then the typing behavior also
changes. So, if an intruder somehow get the typing traces for a particular password
typed by a user then the legitimate user can reset the typing traces by changing the
password.
3.3.5.1 Digraph Representation
In reality, timing traces used for pattern matching are commonly represented as a
set of digraphs. A digraph is an adjacent pair of characters in typing sequence and
associated timing delay between the pressing of the first key and the pressing of the
second key [32]. Fig. 3.3.5 [32] shows an example digraph representation for typing
no.
Fig. 3.3.4: Digraph representation for typing no
The data is kept as a table of time stamps containing key-down and key-up events.
The resulting features are expressed as dwell time (time that key is depressed) and
flight time (latency between key down events) for the various digraphs. Moreover,
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some character sequences and words can be represented as trigraphs or tetragraphs




The chapter introduces machine learning techniques. Two types of classifications:
multi-class classification and one class classification (anomaly detection) are discussed
in detail. The multi-class classification working is explained and eight different types
of classification algorithms are described in depth. Also, anomaly detection’s working
is explained and four kinds of anomaly detectors are discussed. In the end, the
evaluation metrics for the classification methods are explained.
4.1 Machine Learning
Machine learning is an application of artificial intelligence (AI) that provides sys-
tems the ability to automatically learn and improve from experience without being
explicitly programmed [14]. It is generally categorized as supervised or unsupervised.
Supervised algorithms for machine learning are developed to learn from labelled
data. The term “supervised” comes from the idea that training this kind of algorithm
is like having an instructor monitor the entire operation. The training data for the
supervised algorithm’s training consist of inputs with the correct outputs. During the
training, the algorithm looks for the patterns in the training data, which corresponds
with the correct output. Once the training is complete, the algorithm can take unseen
data as inputs and determine the correct label for it based on the data it has seen
during the training phase. Supervised learning aims to predict the correct label
for the unseen sample. The supervised learning can be divided into two sub-types:
classification and regression. In this thesis, we are focusing on supervised machine
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learning methods, specifically classification for user identification.
Unsupervised learning is where you simply have input data (X) with no associ-
ated output variables. The aim of unsupervised learning is to simulate the underlying
structure or distribution of data to get more knowledge about the data. It is consid-
ered unsupervised, since unlike supervised learning above there are no correct labels
associated with the data. The system doesn’t work out the right output, but examines
the details and can draw inferences from datasets to explain hidden constructs from
unlabeled input. Unsupervised learning is further divided into two subcategories:
clustering and association.
4.2 Multi-Class Classification
Classification is the method of determining the class of given data points. Often the
classes are called targets/labels or categories. Classification predictive modeling is a
process in which input variables (X) and it’s related independent output variables (Y)
are used in an algorithm to learn the mapping function from input to output Y = f(X).
The goal is to estimate the mapping function so efficiently that the output variables
(Y) can be predicted for every new input variable (X). The process of learning the
mapping function is called training and the process of getting the output variable for
new(unseen) input variable is called testing.
Fig. 4.2.1 illustrates how the classification works to identify whether the user is a
genuine user or an imposter user. To train the model combination of both the types of
users with their correct labels, genuine/imposter is used. Once a predictive model is
ready, a random unknown user is fed into the predictive model to get its label(class)
as either genuine or imposter user. It is an example of a two-class classification
wherein there are only two classes (genuine / imposter). There can be more than two
classes; those types of classification techniques are called multi-class classification
techniques. Mostly, the systems have more than two users, so generally, the multi-
class classification is deployed to identify the users.
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Fig. 4.2.1: Classifying users into genuine or imposter user category
4.2.1 Support Vector Machine (SVM)
The objective of the support vector machine algorithm is to find a hyperplane in
N-dimensional space (N — the number of features) that distinctly classify the data
points [41]. As shown on Fig. 4.2.2, generally, the model finds a group of hyperplanes
and based on the margin value, it selects an optimal hyperplane that has maximum
margin value, i.e., the maximum possible distance between two classes’ data points.
Support vectors are data points that are closer to the hyperplane and influence the
position and orientation of the hyperplane [41]. The hyperplanes act as decision
boundaries. Points falling on either side of the plane can be given different classes
accordingly. The dimensions of hyperplanes changes with the number of features. So,
for example, for 2 input features the hyper plane is just a line and the hyper plane
for 3 features is a two-dimensional plane.
To measure the similarity between the data points, a kernel function is used. The
function is data dependent and hence it can be selected according to the problem
at hand. If the data points are not linearly separable then the kernel function maps
them into higher dimensions to make it linearly separable and predicts their target
class.
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Fig. 4.2.2: Support Vector Machine: (left) Possible Hyper planes (right) model
selected optimal hyper plane with maximum margin
4.2.2 Decision Tree
The goal of the decision tree is to create a model that predicts the value of a target
variable by learning simple decision rules inferred from the data features [44]. A tree
can be “learned” by splitting the source set into subsets based on a test of the value
of the attribute. This procedure is repeated recursively, called recursive partitioning
on each derived subset. The recursion is completed when the subset at a node all has
the same target variable value, or when splitting does not add value to the predictions
anymore. Fig. 4.2.3 [56] describes an example of a binary tree for predicting a person’s
fitness. It predicts the label from fit/unfit based on the parameters like age, eating
habits and exercise habits.
Fig. 4.2.3: Decision Tree example
At each new node of the tree, the algorithm specifies new rules which led it to the
final target class label.
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4.2.3 K Nearest Neighbor (KNN)
KNN is a lazy learning algorithm since it does not have a dedicated training process
and uses all the data during classification for training. Additionally, It is a non-
parametric learning algorithm because it assumes nothing about the underlying data.
KNN operates by finding the distances between a query and all the examples in the
data, choosing the K number of examples listed nearest to the query, then votes
for the most common label. For instance, we have a dataset having 2 classes in it
(red/blue) and its plotting look like the figure 4.2.5 [50].
Fig. 4.2.4: KNN training set plotting
Suppose now a new data point comes in as the one in black colour. Let’s take
K=3. So, here the K nearest neighbor will find the 3 most nearest data points to the
new data point, As shown on the figure below.
Fig. 4.2.5: KNN find K nearest neighbors
Fig. 4.2.5 [50] demonstrates that the two most nearest data points are from the
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red class and one point belongs to the black class. So, by majority voting, the black
coloured data point will be assigned the label of the red class.
4.2.4 Näıve Bayes
Naive Bayes is based on the Bayes theorem, which assumes that each feature of the
feature set is independent of each other. The key purpose of the Bayesian classification
is to determine the posterior probabilities, i.e. the likelihood of a category given
certain observable characteristics. It estimates the probabilities of membership for
each class, such as the likelihood that a given record or data point belongs to a specific
class. The class with the highest likelihood is considered to be the most likely class.
4.2.5 Logistic Regression
It is an algorithm for predictive analysis and based on the principle of probability.
Logistic regression uses a cost function named ‘Sigmoid function’ or also known as
‘Logistic function’. The hypothesis of logistic regression tends to limit the cost func-
tion between 0 and 1 [6].
Fig. 4.2.6: Logistic Regression Example
The classifier is expected to provide the classes or labels when we provide the input
features through a prediction function and it gives the probability scores in between
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0 and 1. As shown on Fig. 4.2.6 [6] for example, we have two classes genuine user and
imposter user and we keep a threshold of 0.5 to decide which class a sample belongs.
If the score values go below the threshold, then it will be assigned an imposter class
and if it is above the threshold, then it is genuine. Now, suppose the classifier outputs
a probability score of 0.7, then the sample will be labelled as genuine.
4.2.6 Random Forest
Random forests or random decision forests are an ensemble learning method for clas-
sification. Random forest, as the name suggests, is made up of a large number of
individual decision trees that act as an ensemble. Every single tree in the random
forest provides class predictions and in the end, a final class is decided through ma-
jority voting (Fig.4.2.7 [1]).
Fig. 4.2.7: Random Forest Example
The benefit of using the random forest over a decision tree is that each tree
provides the prediction, which helps to correct the error in any other individual tree’s
class prediction.
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4.2.7 Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP)
It is a deep artificial neural network algorithm. Fig.4.2.8 [29] shows the structure
of MLP. The network consists of an input layer which contains a set of neurons
representing the input features {x1, x2, ..., xn}, an output layer which makes the pre-
dictions and in between these two layers there can be N number of hidden layers which
performs the intermediate computations. The model is trained using a set of input-
output variables from which the model learns the association or dependence between
the input and the target variables. The training requires tuning the parameters like
weights and biases of the model to eliminate the error.
Fig. 4.2.8: Structure of Multi Layer Perceptron
4.2.8 Light Gradient Boosting Machines (LightGBM)
Light GBM is a gradient boosting framework that uses a tree-based learning algo-
rithm. What makes it different from other tree-based algorithms is the way it expands.
It grows vertically instead of horizontally (Fig.4.2.9 [39]), which means that it expands
leaf-wise and not level-wise. It always chooses a leaf with a maximum delta loss to
expand, which helps it to reduce more loss than any other level-wise algorithm.
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Fig. 4.2.9: How a Light GBM works
Fig. 4.2.10: How other boosting algorithm works
Light GBM has gained popularity because it is a high-speed algorithm and it can
handle a large amount of data with fewer memory requirements. Also, it majorly
focuses on the accuracy of the results.
4.3 Anomaly Detection (One-Class Classification)
Anomaly detection is the process of finding data objects with behaviors that are
very different from expectation. Such objects are called outliers or anomalies. Many
systems need the ability to determine whether a new observation belongs to the same
distribution as existing observations (it is an inlier), or should be considered to be
different (it is an outlier).
There are three broad categories of anomaly detection techniques. Unsupervised
anomaly detection techniques detect anomalies in an unlabeled test data set on the
assumption that most instances in the data set are normal by searching for instances
that appear to fit the least to the rest of the data set. Supervised anomaly de-
tection techniques require a collection of data that has been labelled “normal” and
“anomalous” and requires training a classifier. Semi-supervised anomaly detection
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techniques create a model that reflects normal behavior from a given standard train-
ing data set and then evaluates the probability of a test instance being created by the
learned model. Among all the unsupervised anomaly detection is the most preferred
approach because, in reality, we don’t have a data set that is explicitly labelled as
normal or anomalous.
4.3.1 Working Of An Anomaly Detector
Every model, in some way, scores a data point than uses threshold value to determine
whether the point is an outlier or not. According to the data given as an input to
the anomaly detector, it decides the threshold value for considering a point to be
an inlier or outlier. For illustration, let us understand it using the concept of the
imposter and genuine user. Fig. 4.3.2 shows the training of an anomaly detector for
a single genuine user. The detector is trained using a part of the genuine user’s data.
The detector decides the threshold and learns a decision boundary according to the
threshold value.
Fig. 4.3.1: Training of an anomaly detector
The trained anomaly detector is tested using the remaining part of the genuine
user’s data (Fig. 4.3.3). The anomaly detector outputs the information of inliers,
outliers and the anomaly score. As the training and testing set are both from the
same user, the anomaly score is called genuine score.
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Fig. 4.3.2: Anomaly Detection for Genuine User
The trained anomaly detector is tested using a few samples of the imposter user
(Fig. 4.3.4). The anomaly detector outputs the information of inliers, outliers and
the anomaly score for the imposter user. As the training and testing set are from a
different user, the anomaly score is called imposter score.
Fig. 4.3.3: Anomaly Detection for Imposter User
The trained anomaly detector outputs anomaly scores as well as inliers and out-
liers. So, how an anomaly detector decides a point to be an inlier or outlier? Fig
4.3.5 demonstrates how a trained anomaly detector makes its predictions. Firstly,
the anomaly score is calculated for a data point; then, it is provided to the deci-
sion function. The decision function compares the anomaly score with the predefined
threshold value. If the score is equal to or higher than the threshold value, then the
data point is categorized as an outlier; otherwise, it is considered as an inlier.
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Fig. 4.3.4: How a trained anomaly detector works (internally)
4.3.2 K Nearest Neighbor (KNN)
KNN anomaly detector saves a list of training vectors during the training and learns
the covariance matrix. During testing, it calculates Mahalanobis distance between
the training and test vectors. Mahalanobis distance is the distance between a point
and a distribution. The distance provides a way to measure how similar a data point
is to a known set of data points. The distance of the test vector to its kth nearest
neighbor is considered to calculate the anomaly scores.
Average - K Nearest Neighbor (AVG-KNN)
Average KNN is a variant of KNN detector with a minor change at the time of
its application. While calculating the anomaly score, the mean(average) of all k
neighbors are considered.
4.3.3 IsolationForest (IForest)
The IsolationForest ‘isolates’ observations by randomly selecting a feature and then
randomly selecting a split value between the maximum and minimum values of the
selected feature [34]. The algorithm partitions the data into a set of trees. Anomaly
score is provided by looking at how isolated the point is in the tree structure [24].
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4.3.4 One-Class Support Vector Machine (One-Class SVM)
It is the one-class variant of the standard Support Vector Machine (SVM) developed
explicitly for anomaly detection. A data point from a single class is projected in a
high dimensional space. A separator is found between the origin and the projection.
Following the same process during the training, it builds the model using the training
data vectors. The test vectors are also projected in the same space. The distance
between the test vector and the partition is calculated as the anomaly score.
4.4 Evaluation Metrics
Any classification’s performance is generally evaluated based on metrics named the
confusion matrix (Fig. 4.4.1 [38], Fig. 4.4.2 [23]). It is plotted using actual values
against the predicted values. In the case of two-class classification, one class is consid-
ered as positive and another one is considered as negative. For example, we have two
classes genuine user (+ve) and imposter user (-ve). based on the confusion matrix,
some parameters are deduced as follows:
• True Positive: When positive class is predicted as positive. For example,
when a genuine user is predicted as a genuine user.
• False Negative: When positive class is predicted as negative. For example,
when a genuine user is predicted as an imposter user.
• False Positive: When negative class is predicted as positive. For example,
when an imposter user is predicted as a genuine user.
• True Negative: When negative class is predicted as negative. For example,
when an imposter user is predicted as an imposter user.
43
4. MACHINE LEARNING TECHNIQUES
Fig. 4.4.1: Two Class Confusion Matrix
Fig. 4.4.2: Multi class Confusion Matrix
Based on the above parameters, some metrics are generated:












• True Positive Rate (TPR): Proportion of positive cases classified as positive
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• Accuracy: The fraction of predictions classification model got right.
Accuracy =
Numberofcorrectpredictions(TP + TN)





The previous chapters have introduced the access control systems, keystroke bio-
metrics and various machine learning techniques. This chapter walks you through
various methods used to build a keystroke-based access control system. Firstly, we
show how multi-class machine learning algorithms can be implemented as a keystroke
based access control system and how it is evaluated using the widely known biometric
menagerie concepts. Secondly, the procedure to use the anomaly detection technique
in the keystroke based authentication system is introduced. This chapter also in-
cludes the process of doing the feature selection on the available feature set. An
insight into the various research based approaches of machine learning and anomaly
detection is provided. The differences between the research based and production
based approaches are also described. In the keystroke systems, the user gets accus-
tomed to the typing device in a short time consequently, their typing patterns change
with time. If the system continues to rely only on the previously trained user profiles
then the chances of user rejections gets increased over time. To lay emphasis on the
problem, two approaches of how a keystroke biometrics-based authentication system
can be updated with the time is provided.
Fig.5.0.1 demonstrates the keystroke authentication process. The procedure starts
with a keystroke sensor like a normal computer keyboard, touch screen keypad or from
any device which can process keystroke. The user provides its keystroke sample by
typing a password, passphrase or a small paragraph. The keystroke sample is cap-
tured in the form of digraph or trigraph. The sample is next forwarded to the feature
extractor unit which processes the raw samples and prepares the template for match-
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Fig. 5.0.1: Working of keystroke authentication system
ing process. It also generates the quality score which indicates how good is the quality
of the provided sample. In the matching phase the system considers the template and
according to the requirement (i.e, verification or identification) it tries to match the
given template with one or more available templates and generates a matching score.
The template matching unit is generally a trained machine learning or statistical
model which does the pattern matching process and generates the matching score.
Matching score denotes how well a template matches with the reference template.
In the end, the quality score and match score are considered for deciding the match.
According to the threshold value considered by the system, a decision for accepting or
rejecting a user is taken. If the match score and quality score are above the threshold
value the user is accepted otherwise the system may reject the user or simply asks
the user to reenter the sample.
The work in this thesis focuses on the template matching part of the authentication
process. It is one of the most important and talked about aspects of the biometrics. It
is the critical part of any biometric authentication system’s decision policy. We have
considered conventional machine learning as well as anomaly detection techniques for
our research. As observed from the fig 5.0.1 every unit contributes in the matching




5.1 Multi-class Machine Learning Methods
In this section, we demonstrate how multi-class machine learning methods perform
in a keystroke based biometrics system to identify users. In the beginning, we discuss
some of the machine learning approaches implemented in the literature. To under-
stand the behavior of a machine learning based keystroke access control system, we
have experimented on a benchmark keystroke dataset [19]. In our work, we have
done classification using eight different classification models. Various researches in
the fields of biometrics have used the concept of biometric menagerie to get better
understanding of the system’s performance. The most commonly used approach is
Doddington’s Biometric Zoo. So, we implemented the Doddington’s Biometric Zoo
concepts in our classification experiments to get an insight into the system’s behavior.
5.1.1 Methodologies Used In The Literature
In the literature ‘Machine learning based soft biometrics for enhanced keystroke recog-
nition system’ [40] Ramu et al. have considered the use of Support Vector Machine
(SVM) for classification. They have performed 5-fold cross validation to evaluate the
soft biometric accuracy. The data was partitioned into 5 subsets. For each experi-
ment run, 4 subsets are used for training the classifier and the remaining 1 subset
is used for testing. The biometric recognition accuracy was calculated by taking an
average of the accuracies of all the runs.
Margit Antal and Lehel Nemes in [5] have implemented two class classification
techniques like KNN, Bayes Net and Random Forest on their collected android keystroke
dataset. Firstly, they select genuine and imposter samples from their dataset. To cre-
ate the negative samples set they have selected random 2 samples from each other user
(users other than the current user). Then they perform N-runs of the randomization
followed by N-Fold cross validation for the given user data and all these steps were
repeated for all the users of the dataset. In other words, if the value of N is 10 then
for each run of cross validation process 90% of the user’s data is used for the training
and rest 10% data is considered for testing. To evaluate the classification based on
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the users’ score they select a threshold and calculate False Positive and False Negative
rate values and derive the Equal Error Rate (EER) value through their intersection.
To perform keystroke identification, Antal et al. in [4] have considered classifica-
tion methods like Naive Bayes, K Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Support Vector Machines
(SVM), Decision Trees and Multi Layer Peceptron (MLP). They have experimented
on an android keystroke data set. For comparison purposes, they performed clas-
sification for keystroke data with and without touch screen based features. They
have experimented by executing 10 runs of 10-folds cross validation on entire dataset.
Consequently, 90% data is considered for training the model and rest is used for the
testing purpose. They have reported the accuracy values based on the average of the
10 10-fold cross validation accuracies.
5.1.2 Data Preprocessing
Data preprocessing is a procedure to convert the data into the format suitable for
a machine learning model. Cleaning and putting the data in a formatted way is
essential. As a part of data preprocessing, we verified our data for missing values,
class imbalances and duplicates. Finally, we removed some features from the dataset,
which are qualitative and not crucial for the classification task. Additionally, before
doing classification, we found the best hyper parameters for the classifier by tuning
the parameters for the classifier using the ‘Grid Search’ method.
5.1.2.1 Grid Search Method
We applied the grid search method for parameter tuning using the function ‘Grid-
SearchCV’ of the sklearn’s library model selection. The method finds the best param-
eter set for the given development set. We started by providing three parameters to
the ‘GridSearchCV’ method: classification model, parameter set for tuning and scor-
ing method. Next, we fit the model for the training set and training label to get the
best parameters. We perform the grid search to get the best parameter set for both
‘precision’ and ‘recall’ scores. Precision expresses the proportion of the data points
49
5. METHODOLOGY
our model says was relevant actually were relevant [Precision = TP
FP+TP
] [52]. Recall
expresses the ability to find all relevant instances in a dataset [Recall = TP
FN+TP
] [52].
At the end of each loop iteration, the algorithm outputs the best parameter set found
for the particular scoring method selected during the iteration.
The Methodology is divided into two parts, in the first part we discussed the method-
ology to categorize individual users into sheep, goat or lamb animal class. In the
second part we describe the methodology for finding the system generated errors.
5.1.3 Part-I: Find Sheep, Goat, Lamb
Fig. 5.1.1: Working of part-I: find sheep, goat, lamb
Fig. 5.1.1 shows the overall flow for part-I, we first divide the preprocessed feature
set into two parts: Training set consisting of 70% data per user and testing set has
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remaining 30% data per user. We forward this data to the classifiers for classification.
As a result of classification, we get a confusion matrix from which we calculate FPR,
FNR and TPR and apply the constraints of sheep, goat and lamb.
5.1.4 Part-II: System Generated Errors
Fig. 5.1.2: Working of part-II: find system generated errors
In this approach, we held one user out for testing and rest are used for the training.
That is, in each iteration, one out of N users is used as a test set. For training, 70%
data from the N-1 users and for testing 30% data from the held-out user is considered
for each iteration. The output will be plotted in terms of the confusion matrix in
order to visualize the distribution of the test user’s samples in other classes. The
reason for doing this is to address our need to understand system’s response towards
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a sample unavailable in it’s training. We decide the wolf by verifying that in how
many classes the test user is present, in other words, in how many classes the test
user’s samples are getting distributed. The higher the number of classes, the higher
the chances of the test user for being a wolf. We believe that the machine learning
based keystroke access control systems will not be able to provide correct predictions
when it encounters unknown samples. It will categorize the given unknown sample
as one of the available categories.
5.2 Anomaly Detection
This section presents the design and implementation of the anomaly detection for
keystroke biometrics based access control system. Firstly, it discusses about the al-
ready implemented works in the literature and their approach to implement anomaly
detection in keystroke biometrics. It also demonstrates the use of feature selection
and normalization. Furthermore, it states differences in the practical and research-
based approaches in addition to introducing practical methodologies to implement
in the system with a limited number of user samples. We claim that the keystroke
biometrics has a tendency to change over time and hence the users’ profiles must
be updated periodically. We describe the methodologies for with and without up-
dating the users’ profiles. To generalize our findings and also to look for platform-
dependent variances in our experimental results we have performed anomaly detection
on the three datasets proposed in [19], [4] and [5] respectively. The first dataset was
collected through a normal PC keyboard; the other two are android device based
keystroke datasets. In the methodology the experiments are described for four dif-
ferent anomaly detectors namely, one-class support vector machine, isolation forest,
k-nearest neighbors and average k-nearest neighbors.
5.2.1 Methodologies Used In The Literature
Killourhy and Maxion, who proposed the benchmark keystroke dataset [19], have
considered 50% data from the total data to train the model. They started by desig-
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nating one of the 51 subjects as the genuine user, and the rest as impostors. They
run the training phase of the detector using the timing information of the first 50%
(200) password repetitions typed by the genuine user. Once the detector builds a
model of the user’s typing behavior, they ran the test phase of the detector using the
remaining 50% (200) repetitions typed by the genuine user and recorded the anomaly
scores as user scores. Finally, they run the test phase of the detector on the timing
vectors from the first five repetitions typed by each of the 50 impostors that are in
total 250 test samples and again recorded the anomaly scores as impostor scores. The
process was then repeated, designating each of the other subjects as the genuine user
in turn. They performed the same process for all the 14 detectors.
Margit Antal and Lehel Nemes in [4] have used five detectors implemented in the R
script provided by Killourhy and Maxion [19] to experiment on the android keystroke
dataset. In their script, they split the data into three equal parts, each containing
20 samples from each user and there are 54 users in their dataset. So, each part
contains 54 x 20 = 1080 samples in total. The detectors are trained separately for
each user using two-third (66.67%) of the data (40 samples/user). The evaluation was
performed on the remaining one-third positive (33.33 %) samples (20 samples/user)
and two negative samples selected from each of the other users (106 samples); The
previous step is repeated thrice (threefold cross-validation), and the mean EER and
its standard deviation is computed.
A similar kind of methodology as [4] is followed by Antal et al. in [5] to experiment
on an android dataset. They also used the R scripts provided by Killourhy and Maxion
[19] to perform verification using the anomaly detectors. The data was divided into
three parts, each part having 17 samples/user. So, in total, each part had (3 x 42
= 126 samples). Two thirds (66.67%) of the data was used for building the user’s
profile (training the anomaly detectors) and the remaining one third (33.33 %) of the
data was utilized for testing FRR. The first five samples from each user excluding the




As a part of data preprocessing, we verified our data for missing values, class imbal-
ances and duplicates. In the end, we balanced the classes in one of the dataset where
required. Additionally, we removed some features from the dataset, which are quali-
tative and not important for the anomaly detection. We have also performed feature
selection and normalization which is described in detail in the following sections.
5.2.3 Anomaly Detection With 70 - 30 Train/Test Ratio
Fig. 5.2.1: Flowchart for Anomaly Detection with 70 - 30 ratio
Unlike the machine learning experiments’ methodology, here, we divide the data into
three parts. There are 2 test sets; one is to get the false rejection rate (FRR) and
another one is to get the false acceptance rate (FAR). As the flow chart demonstrates,
the anomaly detector is trained using 70% samples from one user. To get the false
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rejection rate, 30% test data are considered from the same user and 30% of samples
randomly from other users (except the current user) are used to get the false accep-
tance rate. The same process is repeated for all subjects’ samples. We have followed
this methodology to be consistent with our machine learning experiments and also to
match with the literature based approaches. The approach will help us to compare
our outcomes with the ones in the literature.
5.2.4 Effects Of Feature Selection And Normalization
To compare the effects of feature selection and normalization on anomaly detection’s
performance, previously we applied the anomaly detection without using the feature
selection and normalization methods. To test the impact of feature selection and
normalization on anomaly detector’s performance, we have implemented six types of
feature selection methods on the feature set: Pearson Correlation, Chi-Square, Re-
cursive Feature Elimination, Lasso: SelectFromModel, Tree-based: SelectFromModel,
LGB: SelectFromModel. The features which are not marked important (‘True’) by
any of the feature selectors are removed from the feature set. Once the selected feature
set is ready, normalization is applied using the ‘PowerTransformer’ using method ‘yeo-
johnson’ of the sklearn’s ‘preprocessing’ library. The same experiment for anomaly
detection (70-30 train/test ratio) is performed again, but with the selected feature
set and the observations are derived from the comparison of the anomaly detectors’
performances in both the scenarios.
• Pearson Correlation
We provide the feature vector with the correct feature label vector (target vari-
ables) and the number of features to select from the entire feature set as an
input to the feature selector [34]. The method finds the correlation between
each feature and the target variable and provides its results as select (‘True’)
or not select (‘False’)
• Chi-Square
We provide the scaled feature vector with the correct feature label vector (target
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variables) and the number of features to select from the entire feature set as an
input to the feature selector [34]. This method calculates the chi-square metric
between the target and the feature variables and only select the variables with
the maximum chi-squared values. The result is provided as select (‘True’) or
not select (‘False’).
• Recursive Feature Elimination
The recursive feature elimination (RFE) selects features by recursively consider-
ing smaller and smaller sets of features [34]. It first trains the initial feature set
and obtains the importance of each feature through a coefficient attribute. For
our experiment, we have used ‘Logistic Regression’, and the Recursive Feature
Elimination observes the coefficient attribute of the ‘Logistic Regression’ object.
The recursion continues until the method finds the best possible features for the
dataset and outputs the result as either select (‘True’) or not select (‘False’) for
a particular feature.
• Lasso: SelectFromModel
Lasso is an embedded method that uses algorithms that have built-in feature
selection methods [34]. To implement Lasso, we have used the ‘Logistic Regres-
sion’ as the selected model and L1 as the regularizer. The result is provided as
select (‘True’) or not select (‘False’).
• Tree-based: SelectFromModel
Like Lasso, this is also an embedded method that uses tree-based algorithms
that have built-in feature selection methods [34]. To implement it, we have used
‘Random Forest’ as the selected model. The result is provided as select (‘True’)
or not select (‘False’).
• LGB: SelectFromModel
To apply boosting algorithms like Light GBM(LGB) as a feature selector, we
have used ‘LGB’ as the selected model [34]. The result is provided as select
(‘True’) or not select (‘False’).
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5.2.5 Differences In Production Based And Research-based
Approaches
As seen in the sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.1 “Methodologies used in the literature”, it is
evident that all the experiments and works in the literature are performed using a
large amount of data which is not feasible in real world. One may not ask the user to
enter the password say 200 times or 300 times. It will take long time and meanwhile,
the typing behavior of the user may change, or the user might get frustrated.. In
other kinds of literature, as in the Machine Learning based biometric systems, they
are using various classification techniques, which is fine, but again majority of these
researches are using a huge quantities of data for training.
It is impractical to obtain more than some 10 to 15 password samples from the
users. Additionally, while we have limited samples (let’s say 10 samples) for the user,
then it is not feasible to apply any feature selection. Because, we think that, the
feature selection results may vary when we do it on the entire dataset and on the
small subset of the dataset.
5.2.6 Feature Selection With Less Data
To review the hypothesis that the feature selection will not be much effective in the
case of fewer amount of data we derive a methodology which does the feature selection
with the small subset of the dataset. In this method, we select 10 samples from each
class (i.e, user/subject) of the dataset and create a subset to perform feature selection.
For example, we have 10,000 samples and there are 20 classes in total then we take 20
X 10 = 200 samples and create a subset to perform feature selection on it. Next, we
apply all six feature selectors on the derived subset and record the result to compare
it with the results of feature selection when we considered the entire dataset. If the
outcomes of the experiment demonstrate that there is a difference in the results of
feature selection on entire dataset and the smaller subset then our hypothesis will be
proved correct. Otherwise, if there is no effect on the results, in other words if the
results of both the feature selections gives same feature set then our hypothesis will
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be proved wrong. By following this methodology, we will be able to finalize whether
one should prefer to use feature selection for smaller subsets of data or not.
5.2.7 Without Updating The User Profile
We believe that the user’s keystroke patterns changes over time and hence, the profiles
should be updated periodically. To test this hypothesis we followed the approach
described in this section. Also, from this section we are considering the practical
approach described in the previous section. We are going to consider a batch of 10
samples for training as well as testing purposes.
Fig. 5.2.2: Flowchart illustrating the methodology for user profile without update
We kept the training sample the same for all the user iterations (All the logins).
58
5. METHODOLOGY
We trained the anomaly detectors with the first 10 samples fixed and tested using
the next 10, 20, 30, . . . , N-10 samples for the same user to get the false rejection
rate. To get the false acceptance rate random 10 samples from other users (except
the current user) are used. The same process is repeated for the particular user until
the last sample of the user. The process is repeated for all the users of the dataset.
If the output of the experiment suggest that the update is required and without the
update the system will perform poorly in terms of rejection rates. We will be able to
claim that the typing pattern do change over time. Otherwise, it doesn’t change and
hence we don’t need any techniques to update the users’ profiles.
5.2.8 Methods To Update User Profile
On the basis of our belief that the user profiles do need some kind of update regularly.
We propose two adaptive methods to update the user profile systematically namely
batch mode and sliding window approaches. Both the approaches are novel to the
best of our knowledge.
5.2.8.1 Batch Mode Approach
Experiments are performed with the same anomaly detectors but by using a different
approach. For any user, the first 10 samples are used for training and the next 10
samples are considered for testing (to get FRR). Likewise, for the second iteration,
the second 10 samples (which were used for testing (to get FRR) in 1st iteration) is
used for training and the next 10 samples from the current 10 samples are considered
for testing (to get FRR). At the same time, 10 samples from random users (except
the current user) are used to find false acceptance rate (FAR). The same process
is repeated for the particular user until the last sample of the user. The process is
repeated for all the users of the dataset.
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5.2.8.2 Sliding Window Approach
In this approach we have a window that we move 1 sample per user’s successful
login. We consider the first 10 samples (1,2,....,10) for anomaly detector’s training
for a particular user. To test the detector for the false rejections we fed it the next
sample (11) of the same user. Also at the same time to check for the false accepts
we select random 10 samples from the other users except the current user. For the
second iteration we remove the oldest sample (1) from the training set and append
the training set with the next successful sample (11). Also we update the test set by
moving the test window to the next sample i.e, 12. All these steps are repeated until
N-10 number of samples of the current user. The entire process in repeated for all
the users of the system.
Fig. 5.2.3: Working of the Sliding Window
We believe that this approach will be able to capture users’ behavior better than
the batch mode approach as we are moving one sample at a time. So, it helps train the
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system with the user’s most recent behaviors which in turn helps system to recognize
the user in a consistent manner.
5.3 Summary
To summarize, we established the methodologies to use different multi-class classifica-
tion and anomaly detection methods to build a keystroke-based access control system.
Firstly, we showed how multi-class machine learning algorithms can be implemented
as a keystroke based access control system and how it is evaluated using the widely
known biometric menagerie concepts. Secondly, the procedure to use the anomaly
detection technique in the keystroke based authentication system is introduced. The
chapter also talked about the process of doing the feature selection and normalization
on the given dataset. Additionally, it demonstrated the procedure to perform feature
selection on the small subset of the data. The approaches used by the literature
works for the multi-class as well as anomaly detection is discussed. Furthermore, the
differences between the literature and the practical approaches are reviewed. In the
end, two approaches of how a keystroke biometrics-based authentication system can




In this chapter, firstly, we give brief introduction of the experimental environment
and toolkits. We also discuss about the datasets we have used for the experiments.
We perform analysis of the machine learning based access control system with the
Doddington’s biometric zoo. Additionally, we investigate the anomaly detection based
approaches to know how it behaves in a literature based setting. We also demonstrate
the effects of the feature selection and normalization by experimenting on the anomaly
detection techniques. This analysis will give us an idea about how effective and
efficient are the existing state-of-the art literature based access control systems. In
addition, we show the implementation and evaluate the performance and efficiency
of our proposed practical approaches.
6.1 Environment and Toolkits
We have used a machine having windows 10 installed in it. To perform our machine
learning related experiments in python we installed the anaconda platform for python
on our machine. From various environments offered by anaconda we selected jupyter
notebook as our IDE. Several anomaly detection experiments are also performed on
pycharm IDE for python. The machine learning experiments are executed using var-
ious Scikit-learn methods and anomaly detection is performed using PyOD anomaly
detection techniques.
• Scikit is a free software machine learning library for the Python programming
language [34]. Scikit-Learn offers a wide variety of methods for data mining
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and analysis. It includes various classification, regression and clustering algo-
rithms like Random Forest, K-nearest Neighbors, Support Vector Machine, K
Means, Gradient Boosting algorithms which works with the Python numerical
and scientific libraries NumPy and SciPy.
• PyOD is a scalable Python toolkit for detecting outliers in multivariate data. It
provides access to around 20 outlier detection (Anomaly Detection) algorithms
under a single well-documented API [24]. It supports advance models like neural
networks, deep learning and outlier ensembles.
6.2 Dataset Description
This section discusses about the three benchmark keystroke datasets that we have
considered for our research experiments. The sections mention about the various fea-
tures and number of samples available for each class of the dataset. We are considering
datasets which have been collected from different platforms by typing the same pass-
word ‘.tie5Roanl’. We are using the normal personal computer based dataset for our
machine learning experiments and for anomaly detection we have considered all the
three datasets.
6.2.1 Personal Computer Keyboard Based Keystroke Dataset
The dataset is a benchmark data set for keystroke dynamics proposed by Kevin
Killourhy and Roy Maxion [19]. 51 subjects (typists) typed the password (.tie5Roanl)
400 times over 8 sessions (50 repetitions per session). They waited at least one day
between sessions, to capture some of the day-to-day variation of each subject’s typing.
The data are arranged as a table with 34 columns. Each row of data corresponds to
the timing information for a single repetition of the password by a single subject.The
first column, subject, is a unique identifier for each subject (e.g., s002 or s057). The
second column, sessionIndex, is the session in which the password was typed (ranging
from 1 to 8). The third column, rep, is the repetition of the password within the
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session (ranging from 1 to 50).
The remaining 31 columns present the timing information for the password. The
name of the column encodes the type of timing information. Column names of the
form H.key designate a hold time for the named key (i.e., the time from when key
was pressed to when it was released). Column names of the form DD.key1.key2
designate a keydown-keydown time for the named digraph (i.e., the time from when
key1 was pressed to when key2 was pressed). Column names of the form UD.key1.key2
designate a keyup-keydown time for the named digraph (i.e., the time from when key1
was released to when key2 was pressed).
Fig. 6.2.1: Benchmark dataset snapshot
Fig. 6.2.1 presents typing data for subject 2, session 1, repetition 1. The period
key was held down for 0.1491 seconds (149.1 milliseconds); the time between pressing
the period key and the t key (keydown-keydown time) was 0.3979 seconds; the time
between releasing the period and pressing the t key (keyup-keydown time) was 0.2488
seconds; and so on.
6.2.2 Android Keystroke Dataset - I
This benchmark keystroke dataset is proposed by Margit Antal and Lehel Nemes in
[5]. The data is collected from 54 volunteers through an android application. 13
identical Nexus 7 tablets were used to collect the data. The password used to record
the data was ‘.tie5Roanl’. The data were collected in 3 sessions which were one week
apart. In each session users entered 20 entries of the password which summed up to
total of 60 entries per user in the dataset.
The application implemented a custom keyboard to store the timing , touch screen
and other related raw data from the user’s typing. Typing of the password required
typing 13 keys: 8 letters, a digit, a period character, a shift key to type the capital
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letter and two times the numerical key to switch to and from numerical keypad. The
features in the dataset are summarized in the table 6.2.1 [5]:
Table 6.2.1: Feature Set - Android Keystroke Dataset-I
Feature Feature Explanation No. of Features
Hold time (HT) Time between key press and release 13
Down Down Time (DD) Time between consecutive key presses 12
Up-down time (UD) The time between key release and next key press 12
Pressure (P) Pressure at the moment of key press 13
Finger area (FA) Finger area at the moment of key press 13
Mean Hold Time (MHT) Average of key hold time values 1
Mean Pressure (MP) Average of key pressure values 1
Mean finger area (MFA) Average of finger areas 1
Mean X acceleration (MAX) Mean X acceleration 1
Mean Y acceleration (MAY) Mean Y acceleration 1
Mean Z acceleration (MAZ) Mean Z acceleration 1
Total distance (TD) Sum of the distances (in pixels) between two consecutive buttons 1
Total time (TT) Time needed to type in the password 1
Velocity (V) Quotient of the distance and the total time 1
Total 72
6.2.3 Android Keystroke Dataset - II
An android application was developed to collect the user’s typing data by Antal et
al. [4]. The data were collected in two sessions in which each participant entered the
password ‘.tie5Roanl’ for 30 times per session. All an all 42 people participated in
the study. Though the passwords were entered 60 times by the users, some samples
having deletions were dropped from the final dataset. The final dataset has minimum
51 entries per user.
For data collection Nexus 7 tablet and LG Optimus L7 II P710. In total 37
tablet users and 5 mobile phone users supplied the data. Typing the chosen password
required to press 8 letter keys, a digit, a period character, twice the shift key in
order to type capital letter and twice the numerical keyboard switch key. The feature
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vectors are summarized in the table 6.2.2 [4]:
Table 6.2.2: Feature Set - Android Keystroke Dataset-II
Feature Feature Explanation No. of Features
Key Hold Time (H) Time between key press and release 14
Down-down time (DD) Time between consecutive key presses 13
Up-down time (UD) The time between key release and next key press 13
Key Hold Pressure (P) Pressure at the moment of key press 14
Finger area (FA) Finger area at the moment of key press 14
AH (Average Hold Time) Average of key hold times 1
AP Average of key pressures 1
Total 71
6.3 Multi-class Machine Learning Methods
In this section, we demonstrate the experiments for the multi-class machine learning
methods and how it performs in a keystroke-based access control systems. A bench-
mark keystroke dataset [19] for the normal personal computer keyboard is used to
run the experiments.
6.3.1 Data Preprocessing
As a part of data preprocessing we removed qualitative features like ‘subject’, ‘ses-
sionIndex’, ‘rep’ from the dataset. In classification there are always two vectors:
Feature vector (X) and Target vector (Y). Here, ‘subject’ is the target vector (y) and
other features are considered in the feature vector (X).
6.3.1.1 Grid Search Method
To improve the performance of classification various model parameters are tuned
using the ‘Grid Search’ method. The detail of how the grid search is performed and
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as a result best parameters for a particular model are described in this section.
• Support Vector Machine:
To perform grid search on support vector machine we provided three parameters
to it:
1. ‘SVC (Support Vector Classification)’ function from sklearn library ‘svm’
2. tuned parameters = [‘Kernel’: [‘linear’, ‘rbf’, ‘poly’], ‘c’: [0.1, 1, 10, 100,
1000], ‘degrees’: [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]] where, the kernel parameters choose
the type of hyperplane used to isolate the data. ‘linear’ is used for a linear
hyperplane. ‘rbf’ and ‘poly’ is used for a non-linear hyper-plane, C is a
regularizer which controls the trade off between the decision boundary and
the correct classification of training points, degree parameter is considered
when the kernel is set to ‘poly’. It is the degree of the polynomial to find
the hyperplane to split the data.
3. scores = [’precision’, ’recall’]
for the support vector machine the best parameter set returned by the grid
search method is: kernel = ‘linear’, C = 100.
• Decision Tree:
The parameters provided to tune for decision tree classifier are:
1. ‘DecisionTreeClassifier’ method from sklearn library ‘tree’
2. tuned parameters = [‘criterion’: [‘gini’,‘entropy’],‘max depth’: np.arange(3,
100)] Where, max depth denotes how deep the tree is. The more deeper
the tree the more splits it has and it can capture more information from the
data. ‘criterion’ is the function to measure the quality of a split. Supported
criteria are “gini” for the Gini impurity and “entropy” for the information
gain.
3. scores = [‘precision’, ‘recall’]
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The best parameter set found for decision tree classifier is criterion= ‘entropy’,
max depth = 78
• KNN:
To perform grid search on KNN we provided three parameters to it:
1. ‘KNeighborsClassifier’ method from sklearn library ‘neighbors’.
2. tuned parameters = [‘n neighbors’: np.arange(1, 143), ‘weights’: [‘uni-
form’,‘distance’], ‘metric’: [‘euclidean’,‘manhattan’]] Where, n neighbors
represents the number of neighbors to use. It require to get the best value
of K (number of neighbors) which gives the best performance, ‘weight’
is the weight function used in prediction. ‘uniform’ : uniform weights.
All points in each neighborhood are weighted equally. ‘distance’ : weight
points by the inverse of their distance. in this case, closer neighbors of a
query point will have a greater influence than neighbors which are further
away. metrics is the distance metric to use for the tree.
3. scores = [‘precision’, ‘recall’]
The best parameter set found for KNN classifier is n neighbors = 3, weights=‘distance’,
metric=‘manhattan’
• Logistic Regression:
The parameters provided to tune for naive bayes classifier are:
1. skleran’s linear model library’s LogisticRegression method
2. tuned parameters = [‘solver’: [‘newton-cg’, ‘lbfgs’, ‘liblinear’, ‘sag’, ‘saga’],
‘max iter’: np.arange(100, 2000) , ‘multi class’ : [‘ovr’, ‘multinomial’]]
Where, solver is the algorithm to use in the optimization problem, ‘max iteration’
is the maximum number of iterations taken for the solvers to converge and
In the multi class parameter, if the option chosen is ‘ovr’, then a binary
problem is fit for each label. For ‘multinomial’ the loss minimised is the
multinomial loss fit across the entire probability distribution, even when
the data is binary.
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3. scores = [‘precision’, ‘recall’]
The best parameter set found for logistic regression classification is max iter=2000,
solver=‘saga’, multi class=‘multinomial’
• Random Forest:
To perform grid search on Random Forest we provided three parameters to it:
1. ‘RandomForestClassifier’ method from sklearn library ‘ensemble’
2. tuned parameters = [‘n estimators’: np.arange(50, 1050) , ‘max depth’:
np.arange(3, 100)] Where, ‘n estimators’ represents the number of trees in
the forest, ‘max depth’ denotes the maximum depth of the individual tree
in the forest.
3. scores = [‘precision’, ‘recall’]
The best parameter set found for Random Forest classifier is n estimators=1000,
max depth=10
• Multi Layer Perceptron:
To perform grid search on MLP we provided following parameters to it:
1. ‘MLPClassifier’ method from sklearn library ‘neural network’ is used.
2. tuned parameters = [‘solver’: [‘lbfgs’, ‘sgd’, ‘adam’], ‘alpha’: uniform(0.0001,
0.9), ‘hidden layer sizes’: [(sp randint.rvs(100,300), sp randint.rvs(100,300)],
‘max iter’: np.arange(100, 1000)] Where, ‘solver’ is for weight optimiza-
tion, Alpha is L2 penalty (regularization term) parameter. In the ‘hid-
den layer sizes’ the ith element represents the number of neurons in the
ith hidden layer. ‘max iter’ is the maximum number of iterations. The
solver iterates until convergence or this number of iterations.
3. scores = [‘precision’, ‘recall’]
The best parameter set found for MLP classifier is solver=‘adam’, alpha=0.001,
hidden layer sizes=(150, 100), max iter=1000
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• Light GBM:
To perform grid search on LGB we provided following parameters to it:
1. ‘lgb’ method from the library ‘lightgbm’
2. tuned parameters = [‘num leaves’: np.arange(0, 25), ‘colsample bytree’:
uniform(0, 0.9), ‘learning rate’: uniform(0, 0.9), ‘min child samples’: np.arange(100,
500), ‘min child weight’: uniform(0, 0.1), ‘reg alpha’: np.arange(0,1), ‘reg lambda’:
np.arange(0,1), ‘subsample’: np.arange(0,1) ] Where, ‘num leaves’ is max-
imum tree leaves for base learners, colsample bytree is subsample ratio of
columns when constructing each tree, learning rate is the boosting learn-
ing rate, ‘min child samples’ denotes minimum number of data needed
in a child(leaf), ‘min child weight’ is the minimum sum of instance weight
needed in a child (leaf), ‘reg alpha’ is the L1 regularization term on weights,
‘reg lambda’ is the L2 regularization term on weights, ‘subsample’ is the
subsample ratio of the training instance.
3. scores = [‘precision’, ‘recall’]
The best parameter set found for LGB classifier is ‘num leaves’: 22, ‘colsam-
ple bytree’: 0.87, ‘learning rate’: 0.05, ‘min child samples’: 475, ‘min child weight’:
1e-05, ‘reg alpha’: 0.1, ‘reg lambda’: 1, ‘subsample’: 0.587
6.3.2 Part-I: Find Sheep, Goat, Lamb
In this section we perform experiments to get the sheep, goat and lamb type of users
from the given dataset. Firstly, we performed classification on the given dataset by
keeping the train/test ratio of 70-30 %. From the classification predictions we plotted
a multiclass confusion matrix and calculated the metrics: False Negative Rate, False
Positive Rate and True Positive Rate. To get the sheep, goat and lamb we formulated
the criterion by taking the reference from the doddington’s zoo.
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6.3.2.1 Classification
From the grid search method we could get the best possible parameters for the clas-
sifiers. We took 280 samples out of 400 samples per user to train the classification
model and tested the model with remaining 120 samples per user. Classification is
performed by first training the classification model by training data and to get the
predictions for the new samples testing set is used. Output of the classification is
shown in terms of classification accuracy in Table 6.3.1.
Table 6.3.1: Classification results
No. Classifiers Used Accuracy
1 Support Vector Machine (SVM) 85.9 %
2 Decision Tree 73.0 %
3 K Nearest Neighbor (KNN) 82.5 %
4 Näıve Bayes 66.7 %
5 Logistic Regression 71.2 %
6 Random Forest 87.3 %
7 Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP) 91.7 %
8 Light GBM 94.7 %
We can see from the table 6.3.1 that, some of the classifiers are working quite well
with the dataset like light GBM (94.7%), multi layer perceptron(91.7%), random
forest (87.3%), support vector machine (85.9%) and k nearest neighbors (82.5%).
6.3.2.2 Problem In Finding The Lamb
As per the lamb’s definition, lambs are responsible for the majority of false acceptance
rate, which means any other user is accepted by a system as a lamb. So, false
acceptance rate is nothing but False Positive Rate. FPR is defined by proportion of
negative cases classified as positive cases.
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Fig. 6.3.1: Two Class Confusion Matrix [38]
Fig. 6.3.2: Illustrating FN, FP, TP, TN in resultant multiclass confusion matrix
In the case of multiclass classification, the False Positives (False Accepts) of one
user appears in the entries of the False Negatives (False Rejects) of other users.
Which is not the case with the two class classification confusion matrix. Fig. 6.3.2
demonstrates the resultant multiclass classification matrix. The column highlighted
with red color denotes the false positives for user ‘s002’, The row marked in violet
is the false negatives for the user ‘s002’, The square at the top left corner in the
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blue color is the truly predicted samples (i.e, True Positives) of the user ‘s002’ and
everything else except TP, FP and FN is TN. Consider the row of the user ‘s004’, the
very first 4 samples belongs to the false positives of the user ‘s002’ and the same 4
samples are counted as one of the false negatives while calculating the false negatives
of the user ‘s004’ !
Also, for multiclass confusion matrix true negative (true rejects) is everything else
from the confusion matrix that is not true positive (true accepts), false positive (false
accepts) or false negative (false rejects). So, the value of true negative (true rejects)
will be huge in this case, which will not give equivalent value for false positive rate
(false acceptance rate) as compared to false negative rate (false rejection rate).
Based on above two findings, it can be said that the concept of lamb becomes
fuzzy when we talk about calculating the false acceptance rate from the multiclass
confusion matrix. The same applies to the wolf because if there is no lamb, then there
is no wolf. The sheep and the goat can be easily found.
The findings show that when there are more than two classes, the multi-class
classification techniques are useful only to get the False Rejection Rate (FRR) and
also the True Acceptance Rate (TAR). Which alone is not sufficient to understand
the system’s behavior. Consequently, by using multi-class classifiers we are unable to
debug the biometric zoo model entirely.
6.3.2.3 Find Sheep And Goat
• What can be a Goat?
Goat users have highest chances of rejections when one tries to login with his
own true identity. In Doddington’s zoo goats are defined as below the 2.5 per-
centile of average match score. So, we considered TPR as the match score and
calculated the 2.5th percentile of TPR. To calculate ‘Goat’ following constraint
is considered:
TPR < 2.5th percentile of average TPR
• What can be a Sheep?
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System performs nominally well for them and it is easily detected as a true
user. Sheep is any user which is not a goat. Goats are calculated with TPR less
than 2.5th percentile of TPR then sheep should be somebody at and over 2.5th
percentile of TPR. To calculate ‘Sheep’ following constraint is considered:
TPR >= 2.5th percentile of average TPR
6.3.2.4 Sheep And Goat Results
In this section we demonstrate the results of applying sheep and goat constraints on
the classification metrics (TPR) for each user to categorize them in one of the animal
classes (sheep/goat). The results demonstrates that according to different classifiers
users in goat and sheep category varies. In the resultant tables there are few goat
users marked in red for all the classifiers like users- 2, 7, 8, 20, 32, 34, 37, 50, 51, 56
and 57. They are frequently(commonly) categorized into the goat category by the
classifiers.
Table 6.3.2: Sheep and Goat Results for Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Accuracy: 85.9%)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Sheep 31 3, 5, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 52, 53, 55
Goat 20 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 20, 21, 31, 32, 34,
37, 46, 47, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57
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Table 6.3.3: Sheep and Goat Results for Decision Tree
Decision Tree (DT) (Accuracy: 73.0 %)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Sheep 29 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22,
24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40,
42, 43, 44, 49, 52, 53, 55
Goat 22 2, 4, 7, 8, 13, 20, 21, 26, 29, 31, 32, 34,
37, 41, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57
Table 6.3.4: Sheep and Goat Results for K - Nearest Neighbors
K- Nearest Neighbors (KNN) (Accuracy: 82.5 %)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Sheep 32 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 36, 38, 39, 41,
42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55
Goat 19 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 15, 18, 20, 31, 32, 34, 35,
37, 40, 46, 50, 51, 56, 57
Table 6.3.5: Sheep and Goat Results for Naive Bayes
Naive Bayes (NB) (Accuracy: 66.7%)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Sheep 31 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19,
22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 36, 40,
42, 43, 44, 48, 51, 52, 53, 55
Goat 20 2, 15, 18, 20, 21, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38,
39, 41, 46, 47, 49, 50, 54, 56, 57
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Table 6.3.6: Sheep and Goat Results for Logistic Regression
Logistic Regression (LR) (Accuracy: 71.2 %)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Sheep 30 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24,
25, 27, 28, 30, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41,
42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 52, 53, 55
Goat 21 2, 4, 7, 8, 13, 15, 20, 21, 26, 29, 31, 32,
34, 37, 47, 49, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57
Table 6.3.7: Sheep and Goat Results for Random Forest
Random Forest (RF) (Accuracy: 87.3%)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Sheep 35 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19,
21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36,
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 52,
53, 55
Goat 16 2, 7, 8, 15, 20, 26, 31, 32, 34, 37, 46,
50, 51, 54, 56, 57
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Table 6.3.8: Sheep and Goat Results for Multi-layer Perceptron
Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) (Accuracy: 91.7 %)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Sheep 37 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35,
36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50,
52, 53, 54, 55
Goat 14 2, 4, 7, 8, 20, 21, 31, 32, 37, 46, 47, 51,
56, 57
Table 6.3.9: Sheep and Goat Results for LightGBM
LightGBM (LGB) (Accuracy: 94.7%)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Sheep 35 3, 5, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36, 38,
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 52, 53,
54, 55
Goat 16 2, 4, 7, 8, 12, 18, 21, 29, 32, 34, 37, 48,
50, 51, 56, 57
6.3.2.5 How Close Are Some Goats From Being A Sheep?
The analysis is done on the goat users which are not frequently (i.e, commonly)
classified as a goat by the classifiers. The goat users from all the classifiers are plotted
with their match rate (TPR) and the threshold for being a sheep. The purpose
of this experiment is to know whether there is any classifier specific effects on the
categorization of sheep and goat users.
From the plots, it can be seen that some goats are actually sheeps but due to
category constraint and also due to different classifier behavior variances they are
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classified in the goat category in one classifier while in others they are a sheep. For
instance, Fig. 6.3.6 shows two plots for MLP and LGB, we can see that there are
some goat users in MLP like users - 20, 31, 46 and 47 which are not goats according to
LGB, they are the sheep users. Likewise, users like 12, 18, 29, 34, 48, 50 are goats in
LGB’s results but, they are sheep users in MLP’s results. We can claim that there are
classifier specific effects on users’ categorization. So, the users getting rejections from
one classifier may get accepted when we deploy another classifier to do the matching
process for the templates.
Fig. 6.3.3: Goat users’ plotting with TPR and sheep threshold for SVM
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Fig. 6.3.4: Goat users’ plotting with TPR and sheep threshold for Decision Tree
Fig. 6.3.5: Goat users’ plotting with TPR and sheep threshold for KNN
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Fig. 6.3.6: Goat users’ plotting with TPR and sheep threshold for Naive Bayes
Fig. 6.3.7: Goat users’ plotting with TPR and sheep threshold for Logistic
Regression
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Fig. 6.3.8: Goat users’ plotting with TPR and sheep threshold for Random Forest
Fig. 6.3.9: Goat users’ plotting with TPR and sheep threshold for MLP
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Fig. 6.3.10: Goat users’ plotting with TPR and sheep threshold for LGB
6.3.2.6 Analysis Of Goatish Behavior
To analyze the goatish behavior of a user, we plotted the users with minimum false
rejection rate (sheep) and Maximum false rejection rate (goat) for each classifier with
their hold times for typing password ‘.tie5Roanl’ to interpret the typing pattern for
Goat users. Also, just to visualize more clearly, we plotted with only four characters
‘.tie’.
From the plots it is observed that the goat users have randomness in their typing
behavior. It also demonstrates that the sheep users have very uniform typing patterns
comparatively. For example, according to SVM’s results the user with the maximum
false rejection rate (i.e, goat) is s032 and the user with minimum false rejection rate
(i.e, sheep) is s036. It can be seen from the user s032’s results that there are major
variances in their typing behavior. The spikes in the plot shows the inconsistency in
the typing behavior. If we compare it with the user s036’s typing behavior we can see
that it fluctuates in a small range which is fine, it still exhibits consistent behavior.
So, from our analysis, it can be said that the goat users are goats because of their
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inconsistent typing behaviors.
Fig. 6.3.11: SVM plot for Goat and Sheep user hold times for typing password
‘.tie5Roanl’ and ‘.tie’
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Fig. 6.3.12: Decision Tree plot for Goat and Sheep user hold times for typing password
‘.tie5Roanl’ and ‘.tie’
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Fig. 6.3.13: KNN plot for Goat and Sheep user hold times for typing password
‘.tie5Roanl’ and ‘.tie’
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Fig. 6.3.14: Naive Bayes plot for Goat and Sheep user hold times for typing password
‘.tie5Roanl’ and ‘.tie’
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Fig. 6.3.15: Logistic Regression plot for Goat and Sheep user hold times for typing
password ‘.tie5Roanl’ and ‘.tie’
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Fig. 6.3.16: Random Forest plot for Goat and Sheep user hold times for typing
password ‘.tie5Roanl’ and ‘.tie’
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Fig. 6.3.17: MLP plot for Goat and Sheep user hold times for typing password
‘.tie5Roanl’ and ‘.tie’
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Fig. 6.3.18: LGB plot for Goat and Sheep user hold times for typing password
‘.tie5Roanl’ and ‘.tie’
6.3.3 Part – II : System Generated Errors
In this section we perform experiments to find the errors generated by the system
itself. The results show us that the system tries to predict unseen users as one of
the other available user classes. We call this the system’s tendency to generate errors
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by itself. We call it a system generated artificial Wolf. Firstly, the system generates
lambs and predicts unseen user (wolf) as one of those lambs. The results in the next
section demonstrate the same.
6.3.3.1 Artificial Wolf Results
The wolves derived from the experiments are shown in the following tables. The
users in the wolf category are either goat (G) or a sheep (S) from our Part-I’s results.
So, in the regular functioning of the system they are actually not a wolf but, in
this experiment while we keep these goat and sheep users as held out users they are
converted into the wolf by the same system. The system by itself convert some of
the internal users into the lambs and categorize the held out user as one of those
lambs. So, we call it the system’s error which tries to falsely classify the unknown
user into one of the available categories. For example, table 6.3.10 shows the system
error results for the support vector machine in the results 2, 4, 7, 8, 15, 20, 21, 31,
32, 34, 37, 46, 47 and, 51 are goats, while, users 5, 26 and 35 are sheeps from the
part-I’s results. Additionally, the resultant tables shows that there are variation in
number of the wolf users for each classifiers. For example in table 6.3.10 the number of
wolves are 17, while, for KNN it reduces to 12 wolf users. So, this shows that for wolf
results as well there are classification specific effects. By looking at the experiment
and its results, we can claim that the machine learning based keystroke access control
systems will not be able to provide correct predictions when it sees unknown samples.
It will try to categorize the given unknown sample as one of the available categories.
Which shows the algorithm’s capacity to create errors in the system by itself. This
shows that the systems is not reliable.
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Table 6.3.10: Artificial Wolf Results for Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Accuracy: 85.9%)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Wolf 17 31 (G), 32 (G), 8 (G), 15 (G), 37 (G),
51 (G), 21 (G), 35 (S), 47 (G), 2 (G),
4 (G), 5 (S), 7 (G), 20 (G), 26 (S), 34
(G), 46 (G)
Table 6.3.11: Artificial Wolf Results for Decision Tree
Decision Tree (DT) (Accuracy: 73.0 %)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Wolf 26 2 (G), 4 (G), 7 (G), 20 (G), 26 (G), 31
(G), 32 (G), 34 (G), 37 (G), 47 (G),
48 (G), 51 (G), 56(G), 8 (G), 15 (S),
25 (S), 29 (G), 30 (S) 46 (G) , 3 (S),
41 (G), 50 (G), 21 (G), 18 (S), 54 (G),
57(G)
Table 6.3.12: Artificial Wolf Results for K - Nearest Neighbors
K- Nearest Neighbors (KNN) (Accuracy: 82.5 %)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Wolf 12 2 (G), 4 (G), 31 (G), 32 (G), 25 (S),
48 (S), 47 (G), 7 (G), 8 (G), 29 (S), 30
(S), 34 (G), 35(G)
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Table 6.3.13: Artificial Wolf Results for Naive Bayes
Naive Bayes (NB) (Accuracy: 66.7%)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Wolf 26 2 (G), 4 (S), 7 (S), 20 (G), 26 (S), 31
(G), 32 (G), 34 (G), 37 (G), 47 (G), 48
(S), 51 (S), 56(G), 8 (S), 15 (G), 25 (S),
29 (S), 30 (S) 46 (G) , 3 (S), 41 (G), 50
(G), 21 (G), 18 (G), 54 (G), 57(G)
Table 6.3.14: Artificial Wolf Results for Logistic Regression
Logistic Regression (LR) (Accuracy: 71.2 %)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Wolf 19 2 (G), 31 (G), 32 (G), 8 (G), 15 (G),
57 (G), 11 (S), 18 (S), 13 (G), 16 (S),
47 (G), 51 (G), 54 (G), 39 (S), 53 (S),
4 (G), 7 (G), 20 (G), 26 (G)
Table 6.3.15: Artificial Wolf Results for Random Forest
Random Forest (RF) (Accuracy: 87.3%)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Wolf 13 31 (G), 32 (G), 37 (G), 35 (S), 15(G),
18 (S), 2 (G), 4 (S), 16 (S), 26 (G), 46
(G), 50 (G), 21 (S)
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Table 6.3.16: Artificial Wolf Results for Multi-layer Perceptron
Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) (Accuracy: 91.7 %)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Wolf 10 31 (G), 32 (G), 2 (G), 3 (S), 15 (S), 21
(G), 26 (S), 37 (G), 54 (S), 56 (G)
Table 6.3.17: Artificial Wolf Results for LightGBM
LightGBM (LGB) (Accuracy: 94.7%)
User Type Number of
Users
Users
Wolf 9 32 (G), 48 (G), 7 (G), 31 (S), 34 (G),
37 (G), 41 (S), 50 (G), 57 (G)
6.3.4 Summary Of The Experiments’ Findings
• Through the common classification metrics we are easily able to find the sheep
and the goat but not the lamb and the Wolf.
• Goats are goats because of their inconsistent typing behavior.
• Some goats are sheep, but due to category constraint and also due to different
classifier behavior variances, they are classified in the goat category in one
classifier while in others, they are a sheep. In general terms, it can be said that
there are classifier effects on the results.
• Second experiment shows that there are system generated wolves which exist
in each system so if there can be a system generated wolf then there can also
be an artificial lamb in the system. In general terms, we can say that the
machine learning based keystroke access control systems will not be able to
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provide correct predictions when it sees unknown samples. It will categorize
the given unknown sample as one of the available categories. Which shows the
algorithm’s capacity to create errors in the system by itself.
• Thus, by looking at the findings, it can be said that the multi-class machine
learning methods are not enough unless you come up with the threshold tech-
nique to categorize the user as genuine or an imposter or in the classification you
must have a way to distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate users.
6.4 Anomaly Detection
The multi-class classification methods doesn’t seem promising while we think of using
it for the keystroke based access control systems. Some current state of the art meth-
ods suggest use of anomaly detection based approaches to verify the user profiles for
the keystroke based biometrics system. This motivated us to use anomaly detection
next for our research.
In this section we show experiments and results for the anomaly detection tech-
niques and demonstrate how they work when used for keystroke based access control
system. As mentioned in previous sections all three benchmark datasets are used
for these experiments. Additionally, the section investigates the effects of feature
selection and normalization on the detectors’ performance. A test is presented to
show the need for continuous update of the users’ profiles in keystroke based access
control system. Also, the experiments and results for the two proposed approaches
to periodically update the user profiles are illustrated.
6.4.1 Data Preprocessing
As a part of data preprocessing we removed qualitative features like ‘id’, ‘user id’
from both the android keystroke datasets. Also for the andorid keystroke dataset - II
we performed class balancing. In the dataset majority of the classes have 51 sample
entries, while there are some classes containing more than 51 samples. So, we reduced
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the samples for those classes to 51 to keep the balance between the classes. We also
re-labelled the features in both the datasets like the normal personal computer based
keystroke dataset to maintain the consistency.
6.4.2 Experiments Of Anomaly Detection With 70 - 30 Train/Test
Ratio
In this section we present experiments for anomaly detection using 70% data as
training set and 30% data as a test set. The experiments and results are divided
into three subsections for each dataset. The results for all three dataset demonstrate
that the FAR is very high compared to the FRR. Generally, the false rejection rate
is something which is related to the system’s accuracy. The higher the rejections the
lower the accuracy of the system. False acceptance rate demonstrates the successful
attacks against a particular user. That is the part of the performance evaluation but
not the system’s accuracy. experiments are performed in the section 6.4.3 to see if
we can reduce the false acceptance rates.
6.4.2.1 Personal Computer Keyboard Based Keystroke Dataset
To obtain the false rejection rate, 280 samples for individual user is used for training
and 120 samples from the same user is considered for testing. On the trained model,
total of 120 samples randomly from other users are used to get the false acceptance
rate. The same procedure is repeated for all 51 users of the dataset.
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Table 6.4.1: Anomaly Detection with 70-30 ratio results for Personal Computer Key-




KNN 9.96% 61.5% 90.04%
AVG-KNN 10.4% 59.8% 89.6%
IForest 11.1% 29.1% 88.9%
One-Class SVM 10.1% 68.1% 89.9%
6.4.2.2 Android Keystroke Dataset - I
To obtain the false rejection rate, 42 samples for individual user is used for training
and 18 samples from the same user is considered for testing. On the trained model,
total of 18 samples randomly from other users are used to get the false acceptance
rate. The same process is repeated for all 54 users of the dataset.





KNN 10% 73.5% 90%
AVG-KNN 9.4% 71.8% 90.6%
IForest 13% 23% 87%
One-Class SVM 12% 71% 88%
6.4.2.3 Android Keystroke Dataset - II
To obtain the false rejection rate, 36 samples for individual user is used for training
and 15 samples from the same user is considered for testing. On the trained model,
total of 15 samples randomly from other users are used to get the false acceptance
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rate. The same process is repeated for all 42 users of the dataset.





KNN 12.5% 78.5% 87.5%
AVG-KNN 11.6% 76.6% 88.4%
IForest 11.7% 20.7% 88.3%
One-Class SVM 14% 70% 86%
6.4.3 Effects Of Feature Selection And Normalization
In this section we apply six feature selection techniques on the three datasets and
get the best feature set by removing inessential features from the individual dataset.
Following the feature selection we perform feature normalization. Once the feature
set is ready we again perform the anomaly detection using 70-30 train/test ratio on
the new feature sets and record the differences in the outcomes.
6.4.3.1 Feature selection results
• Personal Computer Keyboard Based Keystroke Dataset
The results are displayed in table 6.4.4 the features marked as “True” are the
important features according to particular feature selection technique. For ex-
ample; the first four features are marked important by all the feature selec-
tion techniques. 6th feature is marked important by “Pearson Correlation”,
“Chi-Squared”, “Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE)”, “Logistics”, “Random
Forest” but according to LightGBM it is not important (“False”). We have
removed those features which are not marked “True” by any of the feature se-
lectors (Total = 0). Those are the features from 25 to 32. The total column
shows the total “True” count the greater the number, the important the feature.
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So, first 4 features are most important features because they have total “True”
count = 6 that is every feature selector marks them as important features.
• Android Keystroke Dataset-I
Same as the table 6.4.4 we derived the important features from the android
dataset. We removed those features which have total “true” count = 0. So, there
are total 7 features marked unimportant by all the feature selectors: UD.e.123,
UD.abc.Shift, DD.period.t, DD.n.l, DD.e.123, DD.abc.Shift and DD.123.5.
• Android Keystroke Dataset-II
We applied all six feature selection techniques on the second android keystroke
dataset and the results suggested to remove 9 features from the feature set.
The features eliminated from the final feature set are: UD.period.t, UD.e.123,
UD.abc.Shift, UD.R.Shift, DD.period.t, DD.e.123, DD.abc.Shift, DD.R.Shift
and DD.123.5.
6.4.3.2 Feature Selection Effects On The Performance Of Anomaly De-
tectors
It is evident from the resultant tables that the false acceptance rate is decreased
significantly while we applied the feature selection and normalization techniques. To
show the improvements in FAR from the previous results we have mentioned the old
values in the red color. For example, refer the table 6.4.5 for the PC based keystroke
dataset the false rejection rate for KNN reduced from 61.5% to 10.4%, for the AVG-
KNN it is 10.6% which was at 59.8% previously. Similarly, for IForest and one class
SVM it reduced to 10.81% and 11.5% from 29.1% and 68.1%, respectively. From the
experiments outcome, it is evident that the feature selection and normalization helps
in reducing the FAR and improves the overall performance of the system.
• Personal Computer Keyboard Based Keystroke Dataset
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Table 6.4.4: Feature selection results for Personal Computer Keyboard based
Keystroke Dataset





1 H.t True True True True True True 6
2 H.period True True True True True True 6
3 H.i True True True True True True 6
4 H.Shift.r True True True True True True 6
5 UD.Shift.r.o True True True True True False 5
6 H.n True True True True False True 5
7 H.l False True True True True True 5
8 H.five True True True True False True 5
9 H.e False True True True True True 5
10 H.o True False True True False True 4
11 H.a True False False True True True 4
12 DD.n.l False True False True True True 4
13 UD.n.l False False False True True True 3
14 UD.a.n True False True True False False 3
15 DD.Shift.r.o True True True False False False 3
16 UD.t.i False False False False True True 2
17 UD.l.Return False True False False True False 2
18 UD.e.five False False True False False True 2
19 DD.l.Return False True False False True False 2
20 DD.e.five True True False False False False 2
21 UD.period.t True False False False False False 1
22 UD.o.a True False False False False False 1
23 DD.t.i False False False False True False 1
24 DD.period.t True False False False False False 1
25 sessionIndex False False False False False False 0
26 rep False False False False False False 0
27 UD.i.e False False False False False False 0
28 UD.five.Shift.r False False False False False False 0
29 DD.o.a False False False False False False 0
30 DD.i.e False False False False False False 0
31 DD.five.Shift.r False False False False False False 0
32 DD.a.n False False False False False False 0
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KNN 10.37% (9.96%) 10.4% (61.5%) 89.63%
AVG-KNN 10.08% (10.4%) 10.06% (59.8% ) 89.9%
IForest 11.06% (11.1%) 10.81% (29.1% ) 88.9%
One-Class SVM 10.86% (10.1%) 11.5% (68.1% ) 89.14%
• Feature Selection Effects On The Android Keystroke Dataset-I




KNN 12.2% (10%) 16.25% (73.5% ) 87.7%
AVG-KNN 11.9% (9.4%) 14.9% (71.8% ) 88%
IForest 13.7% (13%) 14.4% (23% ) 86.2%
One-Class SVM 15.2% (12%) 6.79% (71% ) 84.8%
• Feature Selection Effects On The Android Keystroke Dataset-II
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KNN 14.1% (12.5%) 6.19% (78.5% ) 85.86%
AVG-KNN 11.3% (11.6%) 7.14% (76.6% ) 88.69%
IForest 13.09% (11.7%) 9.84% (20.7% ) 86.9%
One-Class SVM 17.1% (14%) 9.52% (70% ) 82.9%
6.4.4 Feature Selection With Less Data
In this section we present the experiments and results for the feature selection on the
subset containing only 10 samples per user. According to the results’ analysis, for
different feature set sizes the results of feature selection techniques vary. The features
once marked important may become unimportant while the data size provided to the
feature selectors is small. The results demonstrates that the feature selection results
are varying when we change the size of the data. So it is suggested not to use feature
selection with less amount of samples.
6.4.4.1 Personal Computer Keyboard Based Keystroke Dataset
In the result of previous feature selection on the entire keystroke dataset (table 6.4.4)
there are total 7 features which are marked unimportant by all the feature selectors:
sessionIndex, rep, UD.i.e, UD.five.Shift.r, DD.o.a, DD.i.e, DD.five.Shift.r and DD.a.n.
The entire dataset has total 20,400 samples.
On the other hand, when we performed the same 6 feature selections on the
subset containing 51 (total no. of users) X 10 = 510 samples the features marked
unimportant by all the feature selectors reduces to 4 features which are: UD.o.a,
UD.n.l, DD.n.l and DD.a.n. Additionally, the features marked unimportant in both
the categories are not the same.
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6.4.4.2 Android Keystroke Dataset - I
In the previous feature selection results, there are total 7 features marked unimportant
by all the feature selectors: UD.e.123, UD.abc.Shift, DD.period.t, DD.n.l, DD.e.123,
DD.abc.Shift and DD.123.5. The dataset contains 3,240 samples in total.
We performed the same feature selection on the subset containing 54 (total no.
of users) X 10 = 540 samples. Consequently, no features are marked as unimportant
by all the feature selectors. This means all features are important for that particular
subset.
6.4.4.3 Android Keystroke Dataset - II
The previous feature selection result suggested to remove 9 unimportant features
from the dataset. The features eliminated from the final feature set are: UD.period.t,
UD.e.123, UD.abc.Shift, UD.R.Shift, DD.period.t, DD.e.123, DD.abc.Shift, DD.R.Shift
and DD.123.5. The dataset contains total 2,142 samples.
After feature selection on the subset of 42 (total no. of users) X 10 = 420 samples,
the results marked only 3 features as unimportant which are FA.a, FA.shift and
FA.123 which were marked important while we performed feature selections on the
entire dataset.
6.4.5 Experiment Without Updating The User Profile
We performed and presented the results for the normal personal computer keyboard
based keystroke dataset where in we have 400 samples per user. So, we update the
test set with 10-10 samples per iteration, starting with 10, 20, 30, . . . ,390 samples
from the same user to test for the FRR. To get the FAR we considered random 10
samples from the other users (except the current user). The following are the results
for the user ‘s002’ by applying the anomaly detection with the said method.
As we can see except a few iterations in the beginning, the detectors are giving
very high or almost 100% false rejection rate (FRR). It gives us an insight into the
system that if we don’t update the user’s profile, the user has higher chances of facing
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Fig. 6.4.1: Impact of No Profile Update on FRR for user ‘s002’
rejections from the system after sometime of user’s enrollment. Thus, to maintain the
system’s reliability, it should get updated in some way. Following sections discuss the
experiments and results for the two proposed approaches to update the user profiles.
6.4.6 Methods To Update User Profile
The section demonstrates the experiments and results for both the proposed method-
ology to update the user’s profile. The results suggest that the sliding window ap-
proach catches more user behavior variations and is able to perform better than the
batch mode approach that we experimented. Thus, we suggest using sliding window
approach to update the user’s profile time to time when using keystroke biometrics
based access control systems.
The batch mode and sliding window results in terms of anomaly detectors’ perfor-
mance suggests that both the KNN anomaly detectors i.e, KNN as well as AVG-KNN
are giving best results with least false rejection, false acceptance and equal error rates
in the overall results.
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6.4.6.1 Batch Mode Experiments And Results
In this section we present the experiments for the batch mode approach on the three
data sets. The results are shown in terms of tables containing the average FRR, FAR
and the accuracy of the anomaly detectors.
• Personal Computer Based Keystroke Dataset
The dataset contains 400 samples per user. We divide the 400 samples into 40
subsets of 10 samples each. Next, we perform batch mode using the method-
ology from the section 5.2.8.1. All the steps described in the methodology are
repeated until the 40 subsets are used for training for the particular user and
the whole process is repeated for all 51 users of the dataset.
The overall results for each anomaly detector is shown in the table 6.4.8. To
give insight for user vise performance of the anomaly detector, results for first
two users’ of the dataset is also provided in the table 6.4.9.
Table 6.4.8: Batch mode overall results of anomaly detectors for PC keystroke dataset
Anomaly De-
tector
FRR FAR ERR Accuracy
KNN 22.89% 5.97% 16.92% 77.10%
AVG-KNN 23.10% 5.50% 17.6% 76.89%
IForest 24.93% 10.44% 14.49% 75.06%
One-Class SVM 43.20% 3.20% 40% 56.79%
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KNN 21% 4.87% 78.9%
AVG-KNN 20.51% 8.97% 79.48%
IForest 25.6% 13.8% 74.3%
One-Class SVM 48.4% 7.43% 51.5%
S003
KNN 20.25% 9.74% 79.7%
AVG-KNN 21.5% 12.56% 78.4%
IForest 23.58% 9.23% 76.4%
One-Class SVM 35.38% 2% 64.6%
• Android Keystroke Dataset-I
The dataset contains 60 samples per user. We divide the 60 samples into 6
subsets of 10 samples each. Next, we perform batch mode using the method-
ology from the section 5.2.8.1. All the steps described in the methodology are
repeated are until the 6 subsets are used for training for the particular user and
the whole process is repeated for all 54 users of the dataset.
The overall results for each anomaly detector is shown in the table 6.4.10. To
give insight for user vise performance of the anomaly detector, results for first
two users’ of the dataset is also provided in the table 6.4.11.
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FRR FAR ERR Accuracy
KNN 26.89% 10.70% 16.19% 73.11%
AVG-KNN 27.18% 7.55% 19.63% 72.81%
IForest 38.29% 9.70% 28.59% 61.70%
One-Class SVM 56.55% 2.48% 54.07% 43.44%
Table 6.4.11: Batch mode results for users ‘600’ and ‘601’ from android keystroke
dataset-I




KNN 20% 8% 80%
AVG-KNN 40% 2% 60%
IForest 43.99% 10% 55.9%
One-Class SVM 26% 4% 74%
601
KNN 18% 16% 82%
AVG-KNN 13.99% 2% 86%
IForest 30% 15.99% 70%
One-Class SVM 34% 2% 66%
• Android Keystroke Dataset-II
The dataset contains 51 samples per user. We divide the 51 samples into four
subsets of 10 samples and one subset containing 11 samples. Next, we perform
batch mode using the methodology from the section 5.2.8.1. All the steps
described in the methodology are repeated until all the 5 subsets are used for
training for the particular user and the whole process is repeated for all 42 users
of the dataset.
The overall results for each anomaly detector is shown in the table 6.4.12. To
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give insight for user vise performance of the anomaly detector, results for first
two users’ of the dataset is also provided in the table 6.4.13.




FRR FAR ERR Accuracy
KNN 16.67% 9.52% 7.15% 83.33%
AVG-KNN 16.33% 8.76% 7.57% 83.67%
IForest 25.95% 8.61% 17.34% 74.04%
One-Class SVM 63.9% 5.71% 58.19% 36.09%
Table 6.4.13: Batch mode results for users ‘1’ and ‘2’ from android keystroke dataset-
II




KNN 8% 0% 91.9%
AVG-KNN 8% 0% 91.9%
IForest 22% 0% 78%
One-Class SVM 22% 20% 78%
2
KNN 8% 4% 91.9%
AVG-KNN 6% 6% 94%
IForest 4% 4% 96%
One-Class SVM 40% 6% 60%
6.4.6.2 Sliding Window Experiments And Results
The experiments are performed following the methodology discussed in the section
5.2.8.2. The results are shown in terms of tables containing the average FRR, FAR
and the accuracy of the anomaly detectors.
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• Personal Computer Based Keystroke Dataset
The training and testing process is the same as mentioned in the methodology,
the process is repeated until all the 400 samples are used for training for the
particular user and the whole process is repeated for all 51 users of the dataset.
The overall results for each anomaly detector is shown in the table 6.4.14. To
give insight for user vise performance of the anomaly detector, results for first
two users’ of the dataset is also provided in the table 6.4.15.




FRR FAR ERR Accuracy
KNN 17.69% 7.86% 9.83% 82.30%
AVG-KNN 17.65% 6.54% 11.11% 82.34%
IForest 17.85% 10.65% 7.2% 82.14%
One-Class SVM 34.32% 3.46% 30.86% 65.67%






KNN 17.4% 6.38% 82.56%
AVG-KNN 18.7% 5.66% 81.28%
IForest 19.2% 11.7% 80.7%
One-Class SVM 38.9% 7.1% 61%
S003
KNN 17.1% 6.46% 82.8%
AVG-KNN 17.4% 7.92% 82.56%
IForest 13% 11.20% 86.9%
One-Class SVM 28.9% 4.25% 71%
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• Android Keystroke Dataset-I
The training and testing process is the same as mentioned in the methodology,
all the steps are repeated until all the 60 samples are used for training for the
particular user and the whole process is repeated for all 54 users of the dataset.
The overall results for each anomaly detector is shown in the table 6.4.16. To
give insight for user vise performance of the anomaly detector, results for first
two users’ of the dataset is also provided in the table 6.4.17.




FRR FAR ERR Accuracy
KNN 18.44% 10.22% 8.22% 81.56%
AVG-KNN 24.18% 15.31% 8.87% 75.81%
IForest 24.18% 15.31% 8.87% 75.81%
One-Class SVM 47.56% 1.84% 45.72% 52.44%
Table 6.4.17: Sliding window results for subjects ‘600’ and ‘601’ from android
keystroke dataset-I




KNN 24% 6.8% 76%
AVG-KNN 32% 0.8% 68%
IForest 28% 4.2% 72%
One-Class SVM 32% 8% 68%
601
KNN 16% 3.4% 84%
AVG-KNN 14% 0.8% 86%
IForest 24% 17.3% 76%
One-Class SVM 36% 1% 64%
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• Android Keystroke Dataset-II
The training and testing process is the same as mentioned in the methodology,
all the steps are repeated until the 50 samples are used for training for the
particular user and the whole process is repeated for all 42 users of the dataset.
The overall results for each anomaly detector is shown in the table 6.4.18. To
give insight for user vise performance of the anomaly detector, results for first
two users’ of the dataset is also provided in the table 6.4.19.




FRR FAR ERR Accuracy
KNN 17.02% 8.49% 8.53% 82.97%
AVG-KNN 16.42% 8.55% 7.87% 83.57%
IForest 26.9% 8.54% 18.36% 73.09%
One-Class SVM 45.65% 4.12% 41.53% 54.34%
Table 6.4.19: Sliding window results for users ‘1’ and ‘2’ from android keystroke
dataset-II




KNN 12.5% 0.5% 87.5%
AVG-KNN 20% 0.25% 80%
IForest 30% 0.75% 70%
One-Class SVM 25% 8.25% 75%
2
KNN 10% 6% 90%
AVG-KNN 7.5% 4.7% 92.5%
IForest 20% 5.25% 80%
One-Class SVM 52.5% 9.25% 47.5%
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6.5 Comparisons And Discussions
In this section we present the comparison between the batch mode and the sliding
window approach and deduce which one should be used in practice. We also discuss
the differences or similarities in our 70-30 approach and the database literature ap-
proaches. Finally, the comparison is presented for the same dataset literature works
and the proposed approaches for the user profile update.
6.5.1 Comparison Of Batch Mode And Sliding Window Ap-
proach
The comparison of both the approaches is shown through the plots of the EER and
accuracy of the overall results mentioned in tables 6.4.14, 6.4.16 and 6.4.18. The plots
shows that almost in all the scenarios the sliding window approach is performing
better than the batch mode approach. The application of both the approaches is
discussed in the end.
6.5.1.1 Personal Computer Based Keystroke Dataset
Fig. 6.5.1: PC keystroke dataset EER plot for batch mode vs. sliding window
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Fig. 6.5.2: PC keystroke dataset Accuracy plot for batch mode vs. sliding window
6.5.1.2 Android Keystroke Dataset-I
Fig. 6.5.3: Android keystroke dataset-I EER plot for batch mode vs. sliding window
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Fig. 6.5.4: Android keystroke dataset-I accuracy plot for batch mode vs. sliding
window
6.5.1.3 Android Keystroke Dataset-II
Fig. 6.5.5: Android keystroke dataset-II EER plot for batch mode vs. sliding window
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Fig. 6.5.6: Android keystroke dataset-II accuracy plot for batch mode vs. sliding
window
• Batch mode update is useful only when the user is using the particular account
regularly. If the user is using the account for say 2 times a month then to use
batch mode, system has to wait for at least 6 months to update the user’s profile.
Because as per the given methodology the system should have new successfully
logged in 10 samples to update the previous batch of 10 samples. In this case,
the user’s pattern of typing is likely to change before update and for that reason
the knowledge of context affects the behavior of update strategy.
• Consider the same scenario for the sliding window approach, we are updating
the user profile each time the user successfully logins. But, we are not entirely
replacing the previously entered user’s samples, we are just adding newly intro-
duced sample at the end and remove the oldest sample present in the training
set which enhances the system’s behavior. Also, in this approach system is not
required to wait for the 10 new successful samples. The approach is versatile in
a sense that one can use it in any context no matter what it will keep updating
the users’ profiles.
• The batch mode simply replaces the previously entered 10 samples with the
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newer 10 samples which may fail to catch the typing patterns correctly. For
example; A user tries to login and the system trained on batch mode rejects the
user, but there was a chance that the sample had a match with the previously
entered samples which are replaced by the new batch.
• The sliding window moves one sample at a time which helps it to capture
behaviour differences in a better way.
Based on results and the comparison we suggest the use of sliding window approach
in practice to update the user profiles continuously.
6.5.2 Comparison Of Literature And 70-30 Train/Test Ap-
proach
In this section we demonstrate the comparisons of the three data set literature results
and our 70-30 train/test approach’s result for the three dataset.
6.5.2.1 Personal Computer Based Keystroke Dataset
Through our 70/30 approach we achieved lowest equal error rate of 0.02% and 0.03%
from AVG-KNN and KNN respectively. The lowest EER mentioned in the data set
literature [19] was 9.62% from Manhattan (scaled) anomaly detector.
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6.5.2.2 Android Keystroke Dataset - I
We attained 0.7% EER through Isolation Forest anomaly detector. While, in the
dataset literature [5] the lowest EER recorded was 1.31% from the Kmeans anomaly
detector.









6.5.2.3 Android Keystroke Dataset - II
We obtained lowest equal error rate of 3.25% from IForest anomaly detector. The
lowest EER mentioned in the data set literature [4] was 12.9% from the Manhattan
anomaly detector.
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6.5.3 Comparison Of Literature And Proposed Approach
The section shows the comparison of the three data set literature results with the
proposed batch mode and sliding window approaches. The results as shown in the
plot 6.5.10 and table 6.5.4 demonstrate that, even with the user profile update the
sliding window approach is giving quite comparable results with the literature works
done. For the PC based and android keystroke datset-II it outperform the literature
results. The batch mode is also giving good results in case of the android keystroke
dataset -II.
Fig. 6.5.7: Minimum EER comparison plot for each dataset
Table 6.5.4: Comparison of literature and proposed approach


















Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we presented a systematic approach to design and build a reliable
keystroke biometrics system. After debugging the performance of eight different
multi-class classifiers using the biometrics zoos theory, we show that the conven-
tional multi-class classifiers are not suitable for building a keystroke based access
control system. Furthermore, we investigated the anomaly detection techniques in
our work. The effects of feature selection and normalization on the anomaly detection
performance are evaluated, demonstrating that it is beneficial to apply both feature
selection and normalization to reduce the overall false acceptance rates. On the other
hand, we prove that the feature selection is ineffective for the small subset of the data
because the feature set and the feature importance vary when we change the size of
the data. Additionally, we discuss the differences between production and research-
based settings. Although there are several effective keystroke detection techniques
proposed in literature works, which are said to be effective but they are not perfect
for production-based settings. We have introduced two practical approaches that re-
quire only a few user samples to train the anomaly detectors. We also claim that
the keystroke dynamics of a user changes over time, so there is a need for continuous
update of the user profile to maintain the system’s reliability. This thesis implements
two approaches, namely, batch mode and sliding window, to continuously update the
user’s profile. Both approaches use a few samples from the user to process. From
the two proposed methods sliding window is the most effective method because of its
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dynamic update strategy. The batch mode replaces the previously entered batch of
samples with the newer batch of samples, which may fail to catch the typing pattern
differences correctly. The sliding window moves one sample at a time, which helps it
capture behaviour differences better.
7.2 Future Work
Keystroke dynamics is a type of behavioral biometrics. As the keystroke changes
over time other behavioral biometrics also evolve and change with time. In the
future, we plan to carry on investigating other behavioral biometrics for their pattern
changes and would like to apply our proposed methods to see if it is effective for
other behavioral biometrics as well. During our experiments for anomaly detectors
we have only considered four anomaly detectors. In future, it would be interesting
to experiment with other types of anomaly detection techniques. Another interesting
future work could be to develop a real time application which follows our suggested
methodology. We also want to test our approaches against various malicious attacks
to check for any kind of vulnerabilities. This may help us to enhance the quality of
the system. Mhenni et al in [25] supports similar kind of thought as we do that we
can not ask the user to enter the password 100 times to build his profile. They ask
the user to enter a few samples like 10 and then use a genetic algorithm to reproduce
synthetic data (90 samples) that looks similar to the 10 real samples they collected
from the users to build the user’s profile. We also aim to verify this methodology’s
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